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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, socially responsible investment has increased dramatically. 
Socially responsible investing is “an investment process that considers the social and 
environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the 
context of rigorous financial analysis” (Social Investment Forum 2006, 2). A survey of 
mutual funds, money managers, and institutional investors by the Social Investment 
Forum, Ltd. reports that in 2005 one out of every ten dollars under professional 
management in the U.S. was involved in socially responsible investing. Socially 
responsible investment assets equaled $639 billion in 1995 and $2.29 trillion in 2005, 
with a growth rate four percent faster than that of total assets under professional 
management (Social Investment Forum 2006).1 The development suggests that there is a 
demand for social and environmental information on the part of investors. 
Social investment managers consider voluntary environmental disclosures to be 
                                                 
1
 The Social Investment Forum, Ltd. is a nonprofit association, promoting socially and environmentally 
responsible investing. In 1989, environmental groups and institutional investors represented by the Social 
Investment Forum, Ltd. set up the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics (CERES) to 
promote environmentally responsible actions and environmental disclosure. CERES created the Valdez 
Principles (later changed the name to CERES Principles) that are used to direct corporate environmental 
conduct (www.ceres.org). In 2005, the Social Investment Forum, Ltd. has over 500 social investment 
practitioners and institutions, including financial advisers, analysts, portfolio managers, banks, mutual 
funds, foundations, community development organizations, researchers, and public educators.   
The report titled “2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States” was 
sponsored by 17 organizations that specialize in socially responsible investing. They are mutual funds, 
financial advisors, asset management corporations, and independent research agents. At the end of the 
report, there are lists of socially and environmentally screened funds, money managers providing social 
screening, institutions involved in social or environmental investing, and shareholder resolution proponents 
from 2003 to 2005 (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
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an important source of information about a firm’s environmental performance (e.g., 
Calvert 2006). Social Investment Research Analyst Network (SIRAN), a network of 150 
North American social investment analysts, emphasizes the importance of corporate 
social responsibility and sustainability reporting, which includes environmental 
information. Analysts believe that having either a separate section on the company 
website or an annual report about corporate social responsibility or sustainability, shows 
a commitment to environmental protection and reporting transparency (SIRAN 2006). 
Environmental disclosure is “the set of information items that relate to a firm’s 
past, current and future environmental management activities and performance” and 
“information about the past, current and future financial implications resulting from a 
firm’s environmental management decisions or actions” (Berthelot et al. 2003 , 2). 
Voluntary environmental disclosure (VED) is environmental disclosure not required by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or accounting standards. In the United 
States, more and more companies are voluntarily disclosing environmental information. 
Voluntary environmental and corporate responsibility reports have grown from 27 
published in 1992 to 1,970 published in 2005 (CorporateRegister.com 2006). This 
upward trend suggests that reporting companies believe there are benefits to voluntarily 
disclosing environmental information. 
These voluntary environmental reports, however, do not contain any standard set 
of information. Disclosures vary substantially in terms of content, information, and 
length. There are concerns that companies may use environmental publications primarily 
to enhance their public image (Beets and Souther 1999; Gorte 2005; Lydenberg 2005). 
This tactic, known as “greenwashing,” is the use of environmental disclosure as 
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“exercises in public relations rather than environmental responsibility” (Beets and 
Souther 1999, 133). The term is also used in Wallis (1997), Newton and Harte (1997), 
and Greer and Bruno (1996) among other research. 
Concern about the quality of VED makes it important to understand the factors 
influencing voluntary disclosure of environmental information and the quality of the 
disclosures. Drawing upon prior literature that relates disclosures to a company’s 
competitive position in the industry, this study hypothesizes that a company’s 
competitive strategy is an important factor in the VED decision, and also influences the 
quality of VED. The research question motivating this study is: Does VED relate to 
competitive strategy and actual environmental performance? To answer this question, this 
study has two objectives. The first is to determine whether a company’s competitive 
strategy guides its voluntary environmental disclosure decision. The second is to 
determine how competitive strategy impacts the association between voluntary 
environmental disclosure and actual environmental performance. 
 This study examines two competitive strategies. One is investment in brand 
image, and the other is investment in research and development (R&D). Using VED 
about 2004 environmental performance, this study finds that companies emphasizing 
investment in brand image tend to voluntarily provide more environmental information 
(but not necessarily regarding environmental performance) than companies that do not 
emphasize this strategy. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D tend to make more 
voluntary disclosures about environmental performance than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy.  
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 VED is of high quality if a positive relation exists between VED and 
environmental performance (Berthelot et al. 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). For 
companies that do not emphasize the two competitive strategies, more VED does not 
relate to good environmental performance. This is understandable because the proxies for 
environmental performance are the toxics management outcomes that will be eventually 
released by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The information on toxics 
management is publicly available and comparable. To poor environmental performers, 
hiding the adverse news in other information or omitting the news could be the choice of 
disclosure decisions (i.e., “greenwashing”).  
The two competitive strategies affect the association between VED and 
environmental performance differently. If the environmental performance proxy has 
implications for sustainability (e.g., percentage of toxics recycled), the association 
between VED and environmental performance is the same or more negative for 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image compared to other companies; but the 
association is more positive for companies emphasizing investment in R&D relative to 
other companies. If the environmental performance proxy has implications for 
environmental liabilities (e.g., percentage of toxics disposed of or otherwise released), 
more VED is less likely to relate to poor environmental performance for companies 
emphasizing investment in brand image relative to other companies; and more VED is 
the same or less likely to relate to poor environmental performance for companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D relative to other companies. 
 This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to the 
voluntary disclosure literature by testing the influence of competitive strategy on 
 5 
voluntary environmental disclosure. Prior studies on factors that influence voluntary 
disclosure focused on factors such as competition, new issuance of securities, and public 
pressure (e.g., Gamble et al. 1995; Walden and Schwartz 1997; Harris 1998; Lang and 
Lundholm 2000). This study extends the literature by focusing on another important 
factor, the competitive strategy of a company, in the context of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. One prior study has called for attention to the impact of overall corporate 
strategy (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004, ACH), but it claims that overall corporate strategy 
cannot be observed. ACH thus only implicitly include the factor of corporate strategy in 
their research design. By contrast, this study identifies two specific competitive strategies 
and directly tests their influence on the voluntary environmental disclosure decision. 
Moreover, this study further investigates the strength of the association between VED 
and environmental performance under different competitive strategies. Finally, this study 
focuses on voluntary environmental disclosures, whereas ACH examine environmental 
disclosures in 10Ks that contain mandatory information (Clarkson et al. 2006). The 
results of this study indicate the need for future studies to incorporate competitive 
strategy into the determinants of voluntary disclosure decisions. 
The second contribution of this study is that it presents a new perspective on 
examining the reliability of environmental disclosures. In the environmental disclosure 
literature, VED is considered reliable if the disclosures are helpful to estimate actual 
environmental performance; and prior research has reported inconsistent results on it 
(Berthelot et al. 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2006). This study 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence that different competitive strategies 
lead to varied VED strategies, which result in varied VED quality. The findings of this 
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study should be of interest to investors, because investors may not be able to get timely 
environmental performance data or afford the cost to collect environmental performance 
data, and have to rely on companies’ self-reported information.2 The results from this 
study may help investors identify one condition under which voluntarily disclosed 
environmental information is a useful indicator of environmental performance and its 
financial implications. 
This study focuses on the chemical industry because prior studies identify it as a 
highly polluting industry. In addition, the chemical industry has more companies with 
environmental performance information and competitive strategy data than those in other 
industries. Focusing on a single industry controls for unknown factors that may affect 
VED and vary systematically across industries. The limitation of doing so is that the 
conclusions may not be generalizable to companies in other industries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews prior 
literature. Chapter III presents the hypotheses. Chapter IV discusses research design and 
sample selection. Chapter V reports descriptive statistics and the results of hypothesis 
testing. The last chapter concludes the paper.  
                                                 
2
 The problem of having timely environmental performance data may be shown by the fact that the toxic 
releases information in 2004 was released on April 12, 2006 by the EPA, which is a 1.5 year lag.  The EPA 
is aware of the timing problem and tries to accelerate the whole process. Around October 2006, it released 
an early version of 2005 toxic releases data, but allowed facilities to keep revising their reports until spring 
2007. 
The cost of colleting environmental performance data may be high for several reasons. First, environmental 
performance covers a lot of areas such as energy, water, waste, and biodiversity. It is difficult to summarize 
all performance by one measure. Second, companies apply different indices in the same environmental 
area. Third, even measures for toxics management activities are comparable in U.S., they are at the facility 
level and it is very time-consuming to pull all facilities together to get the performance of the parent 
company.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Voluntary Disclosure Strategies 
 Dye (2001, 184) states that “any entity contemplating making a disclosure will 
disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose information 
unfavorable to the entity.” “Favorable” here indicates impressing shareholders positively, 
protecting jobs from hostile takeover, increasing stock prices and so on (Revsine 1991; 
Healy and Palepu 2001). To achieve favorable results, some companies may misrepresent 
information, while others will provide accurate information to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
 Revsine (1991) proposes a selective misrepresentation hypothesis, suggesting that 
managers use disclosures to manipulate investors’ perceptions. Many findings support 
this aspect of disclosure. For instance, listed firms offer more reasons and causes for 
corporate events or performance than do unlisted firms. Firms selectively direct public 
focus so that positive effects will be reinforced and negative effects will be corrected or 
supplanted (Aerts 2005). Regardless of performance, companies emphasize positive 
outcomes. They attribute good news to their own actions and bad news to external factors 
(Clatworthy and Jones 2003). 
Specific company narratives are used to manage impressions. For example, as 
earnings decline, firms may shift disclosures from long-term forecasts to short-term 
 8 
forecasts (Miller 2002). This practice allows firms to focus on current positive news and 
avoid discussion of possible long-term decline. The market apparently does not see 
through the change in the forecast time horizon and does not adjust its expectations. 
Schrand and Walther (2000) find that firms separate a prior-period nonrecurring gain 
from the sale of property, plant and equipment but hide a loss so that they can show a 
maximum increase (or a minimum decrease) in current earnings. Surprisingly, investors 
do not verify the prior period information but use the benchmark provided in the earnings 
announcement to evaluate current earnings. These studies imply that companies try to 
manage investors’ perceptions. Moreover, evidence shows that investors have limited 
memory and information processing power, so the manipulation attempts could be 
successful (e.g., Hobson and Kachelmeier 2005; Krische 2005; Hirshleifer and Teoh 
2003). 
 Prior studies also show that companies use voluntary disclosure to provide the 
market with useful information. The main effect of this type of voluntary disclosure is 
reduced information asymmetry (e.g., Welker 1995; Botosan 1997; Verrecchia 2001). 
Recent studies providing similar evidence include Brown et al. (2004), who use the 
information embedded in the daily trading orders to capture the degree of information 
asymmetry. They find that increasing the number of conference calls (voluntary 
disclosure) leads to lower probability of private information-based trading in the 
subsequent quarter. They also find that the effect on information asymmetry does not 
exist for a one-time conference call. Guo et al. (2004) study the initial public offering 
prospectuses of biotech companies. They report that detailed disclosures about products 
are linked to lower bid-ask spread, lower return volatility and higher quoted depth, where 
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bid-ask spread, return volatility, and quoted depth are proxies for information asymmetry. 
Francis et al. (2005) examine whether the finding of reduced information asymmetry can 
be generalized to countries other than the United States. They find that even though legal 
and financial systems may differ among countries in the sample, the negative association 
between voluntary disclosure scores and cost of capital still holds. 
In summary, the literature on voluntary disclosure suggests that voluntary 
disclosure provides both useful and misleading information to investors. When 
processing this type of information, investors may need additional help in discriminating 
useful information from noise. This study explores an approach to supporting investors in 
the context of VED. 
 
2.2 Environmental Disclosure  
2.2.1 Environmental disclosure strategies 
 Research on environmental disclosure has focused primarily on information in 
annual reports and 10Ks, which are a mix of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
(Clarkson et al. 2006). One stream of this literature shows that companies choose the 
types of environmental information in an attempt at impression management. For 
instance, 15 out of 18 firms identified as a “Potentially Responsible Party” under the 
Superfund Act do not disclose the fact; even though 80 percent of them have above-
average disclosure scores (Fekrat et al. 1996). Companies also disclose more 
environmental information when they experience a loss or when regulatory challenges 
are intense. Furthermore, companies tend to select positive examples of firm actions 
while reframing or ignoring negative actions (Neu et al. 1998). A study finds that in the 
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environmental section of annual reports, Finnish companies disclose a higher proportion 
of known positive events than the proportion of known negative events (Niskanen and 
Nieminen 2001). These types of environmental disclosure behaviors may fall into the 
category of “greenwashing”. The practice tries to paint an environmentally friendly 
image for a firm, and it passes on little verifiable information about actual environmental 
performance (Beets and Souther 1999). 
 Another stream of literature has established that environmental liabilities and 
environmental expenditure affect investors’ judgments regarding a company’s 
profitability potential, and the knowledge of environmental performance facilitates the 
estimation of financial implications from environmental activities (Barth and McNichols 
1994; Clarkson et al. 2004; Cormier and Magnan 1997; Hughes 2000). Evidence shows 
that some companies provide such useful information in their annual reports and/or 10Ks 
(Belkaoui 1976; Barth et al. 1997; Li and McConomy 1999). 
 
2.2.2 Value relevance of environmental disclosure 
Prior studies report that environmental disclosure is associated with firm stock 
performance.3 Anderson and Frankle (1980) compare the portfolio return of socially 
disclosing firms with the portfolio return of non-socially disclosing firms from July 1972 
to June 1973. The types of social disclosures they discuss include several areas; the most 
common area is environmental controls. They report that investors pay a premium for 
firms making social disclosures once the disclosures are released in the annual reports. 
                                                 
3
 Most studies find that environmental disclosure has a positive effect on stock price (e.g., Anderson and 
Frankle (1980); Freedman and Stagliano (1991); Blacconiere and Patten (1994); Patten and Nance (1998); 
Magness (2002); Patten and Trompeter (2003)). An exception is Richardson and Welker (2001), which 
finds the more the social disclosure the higher the cost of capital. This relation is especially obvious for less 
profitable companies. 
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They also find that investors reward firms with a prior history of disclosure more than 
firms new in making social disclosures.  
Further support for this finding is reported by Blacconiere and Patten (1994), who 
document a negative market return for chemical firms after Union Carbide’s chemical 
leak accident in Bhopal, India in 1984. The researchers note that firms with relatively 
extensive environmental disclosure prior to the accident suffered less negative market 
reaction than firms with limited environmental disclosure. A further examination of 
chemical firms’ reactions to the Bhopal accident found that chemical firms disclosing 
more environmental information in their 10Ks before the accident had a smaller amount 
of negative discretionary accruals after the event (Patten and Trompeter 2003). An 
investigation of the Exxon Valdez oil spill reported positive abnormal returns for U.S. 
petroleum and refining companies due to potential price increases for crude oil, 
wholesale gasoline and retail gasoline after the accident. The market response, however, 
was moderated by less extensive environmental disclosure prior to the event (Patten and 
Nance 1998). These studies suggest that having a commitment to environmental 
disclosure is recognized by investors after bad environmental news. 
2.2.3 Reliability of environmental disclosure 
Studies on environmental disclosure define reliability as whether the disclosures 
are helpful in estimating actual environmental performance. Early studies suggest that 
environmental disclosure may have no relationship with environmental performance 
(Ingram and Frazier 1980; Wiseman 1982; Freedman and Wasley 1990; Fekrat et al. 
1996). In these studies, disclosure scores were generated using a content analysis and 
environmental performance was the rating issued by the Council on Economic Priorities 
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(CEP).  Using similar measures, Hughes et al. (2001) find that poor environmental 
performers have higher environmental disclosure scores than firms with good or mixed 
performance. However, the extent of disclosure could not differentiate actual 
environmental performance.  
Patten (2002) uses a relatively large sample (131 firms), adjusts toxics release by 
revenue, and controls for firm size and industry. He finds a negative association between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. Similarly, Bewley and Li 
(2000) find that firms with high pollution propensity (i.e., poor environmental 
performance) tend to disclose more general environmental information.  
More recently, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) show that firms with less pollution are 
more likely to disclose pollution-related information. Clarkson et al. (2006) contend that 
the disclosures in Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) are largely mandatory. Clarkson et al. (2006) 
study voluntary disclosures and find that firms with good environmental performance are 
inclined to disclose environmental information. The conclusion is the same regardless of 
whether the disclosure measure is content based or is a simple dichotomous variable.  
This study most closely relates to Clarkson et al. (2006) in that both papers 
examine VED and use toxic-related data as a proxy for environmental performance. 
However, the two studies are motivated differently. Clarkson et al. (2006) focus on the 
signaling effects of disclosure, while this study examines the influence of competitive 
strategy on disclosure.  
In summary, literature on environmental disclosure generally finds that the 
disclosure is value relevant. But prior studies report inconsistent results on the relation 
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. Therefore, the 
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reliability of environmental disclosure is questionable (Berthelot et al. 2003). The 
problem of reliability may be partly explained by the nature of environmental disclosure 
in annual reports and 10Ks, which is a mix of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. On 
the one hand, poor environmental performers may be reluctant to disclose environmental 
information, but are required to disclose it under SEC regulations and accounting 
standards. On the other hand, good environmental performers may want to publicize their 
achievements but the disclosure is not required by regulation. This study proposes that 
VED provides an opportunity to examine whether environmental disclosure could be a 
good indicator of environmental performance. Specifically, this study identifies when 
VED is more likely to be greenwashing, and when VED is more likely to be informative.  
 
2.3 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure  
 Previous research suggests that factors such as equity issuance affect managers’ 
disclosure decisions. In a study of companies issuing seasoned securities, Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) find that these companies make more disclosures during the six months 
leading to the offering than during the six months starting a year ago, and disclose more 
information than do non-issuing companies over the same time period.  
In the environmental disclosure area, studies such as Barth et al. (1997) find that 
firms frequently accessing capital markets are more likely to disclose environmental 
information. Studies also report that large firms, firms in high-polluting industries, and 
firms facing risk of new stringent environmental laws tend to disclose more 
environmental information (Patten 1992; Li et al. 1997; Walden and Schwartz 1997; Neu 
et al. 1998; Bewley and Li 2000; Cormier and Magnan 2003). Public pressure and media 
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coverage pertaining to corporate environmental activities may encourage or discourage 
firms to make environmental disclosure (Gamble et al. 1995; Li et al. 1997; Brown and 
Deegan 1998; Neu et al. 1998). 
 Prior literature on corporate disclosure has examined the effects of different 
factors on disclosure behaviors, but tends to ignore the influence of internal factors, such 
as a company’s competitive strategy, on disclosure decisions (e.g., Ullmann 1985; Patten 
1991; Gamble et al. 1995). One reason for this lack may be the difficulty in identifying 
and measuring internal factors. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) tried to include overall corporate 
strategy in their investigation of interactions among environmental performance, 
economic performance, and environmental disclosure. They argue that corporate strategy 
is “unobservable” so they set up a simultaneous equation system to capture the impact of 
corporate strategy on environmental performance, economic performance, and 
environmental disclosure. They find that economic performance does not determine 
environmental performance. That is, the cost of environmental responsibility is not as a 
big problem as generally believed. However, good environmental performance positively 
affects economic performance. They also report that good environmental performers tend 
to disclose quantitative pollution-related environmental information. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
This study proposes that competitive strategy plays an important role in the 
voluntary environmental disclosure decision. Competitive strategy, an overall plan 
enabling a company to “establish a profitable and sustainable position” in the industry 
(Porter 1985), is designed to guide all activities and decisions within a company. One 
activity guided by competitive strategy is disclosure management. How disclosures are 
managed can affect a company’s competitive position in the industry (Ozbilgin and 
Penno 2005), because proprietary costs can be incurred by disclosures (Verrecchia 1983; 
Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wagenhofer 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992; Newman and 
Sansing 1993; Darrough 1993; Gigler 1994; Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Li et al. 1997; 
Price 1999; Guo et al. 2004). These proprietary costs occur when competitors respond to 
a company’s disclosure decision by undertaking actions that adversely affect the 
disclosing company’s future cash flows (Wagenhofer 1990).  
 Even with a general knowledge of factors causing competitive disadvantage, it is 
difficult for a company to predict competitors’ reaction to a particular disclosure (Elliott 
and Jacobson 1994; Guo et al. 2004). For example, the announcement of a green 
technology may encourage competitors to strive to catch up, but it may also persuade 
competitors to give up the area because the disclosing company is much advanced in 
development. Disclosures then are likely to be managed in a way that they are consistent  
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with the company’s competitive strategy.4 When proprietary costs are incurred, it is 
easier for managers to justify the decision if the disclosure was aligned with the 
company’s competitive strategy than if it was not. 
This study examines whether voluntary environmental disclosure is a function of 
competitive strategy. The two competitive strategies examined here are: (1) investment in 
brand image, and (2) investment in research and development (R&D). These two 
strategies are chosen because they are main competitive strategies emphasized by 
companies and they are observable based on public data. Data for other strategies (such 
as simpler product designs and more flexible delivery) are not available.  
Companies emphasizing one of the two strategies are believed to have a tendency 
to publish more voluntary environmental information. For companies emphasizing the 
strategy of investment in brand image, voluntary environmental disclosure provides an 
opportunity to build brand image and/or corporate image (Varadarajan 1992; Hoeffler 
and Keller 2002). Evidence shows that many companies incorporate environmental issues 
into marketing activities (Menon and Menon 1997; Handelman and Arnold 1999). The 
purpose is to attract environmentally conscious investors and consumers (Belkaoui 1976; 
Menon and Menon 1997; Banerjee et al. 2003). Green marketing has helped companies 
achieve competitive advantage in the product market (Hart 1995; Mohr and Webb 2005). 
Companies with a high level of R&D investment are apt to make voluntary 
disclosures (Lhuillery 2006). Via disclosure, companies deliver the message that they are 
competent and worth working with (Muller and Penin 2006). In addition, revealing 
                                                 
4
 Based on interviews, Gibbins et al. (1990) suggest that corporate strategy plays a role in disclosure 
decisions. Corporate strategy here refers to plans regarding markets a company chooses to enter and 
exchanges a company decides to list on. Gibbins et al. (1990) also note that internal politics is involved in 
disclosure decisions. 
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knowledge from R&D may lead to related innovation from other companies that will 
increase the popularity of disclosing company’s products and technology (De Fraja 1993; 
Katz and Shapiro 1994). In general, firms sharing knowledge enjoy higher innovation 
productivity (Lhuillery 2006). Prior literature also suggests that companies emphasizing 
the strategy of investment in R&D are more likely to work on technologies and 
production processes that may improve environmental performance (Hasseldine et al. 
2005). These companies have environmental information to communicate to investors 
and competitors. Therefore, the first set of hypotheses stated in the alternative form is: 
 
H1a: Companies emphasizing a strategy of investment in brand image are likely 
to voluntarily disclose more environmental information than companies that 
do not emphasize this strategy. 
 
H1b: Companies emphasizing a strategy of investment in research and 
development are likely to voluntarily disclose more environmental 
information than companies that do not emphasize this strategy. 
 
 The attempts to align disclosure with competitive strategy imply that companies 
would manage disclosed information with respect to content, redundancy, format and so 
on. As a result, the quality of information is affected. Prior studies suggest that 
companies want to manipulate investors’ perceptions (e.g., Revsine 1991; Schrand and 
Walther 2000). This point of view is adopted in the environmental disclosure area, where 
the primary purpose of VED is to build a high-profile image (e.g., Fekrat et al. 1996; 
Patten 2002). As responding to environmental concerns could be part of marketing 
practice (Menon and Menon 1997; Handelman and Arnold 1999) and green marketing is 
a subset of information disclosure strategies (Prakash 2002), this study proposes that 
companies emphasizing the strategy of investment in brand image are more likely to use 
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voluntary environmental disclosure as a public relations tool, namely, greenwashing. As a 
result, extensive voluntary environmental disclosure is less likely to be linked to good 
environmental performance. 
In contrast, previous research shows that companies offer useful information to 
reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors (e.g., Botosan 1997; 
Brown et al. 2004). In the environmental disclosure field, some companies release 
information such as environmental liabilities, expenditure, and performance to the public 
(Belkaoui 1976; Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Barth et al. 1997; Li and McConomy 
1999). Given that research and development facilitates investment in environmentally 
friendly technology and products (Hasseldine et al. 2005), companies emphasizing the 
strategy of investment in R&D are likely to have environment-related achievements to 
communicate. Consistent with the rigor involved in undertaking research and 
development, companies emphasizing the strategy of investment in R&D are more likely 
to have VED as an indicator of environmental performance than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy (Lev 1992). Therefore, extensive disclosure from these companies 
should strongly relate to good environmental performance. The second set of hypotheses 
is stated below in the alternative form: 
 
H2a: The association between voluntary environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance is weaker for companies that emphasize a 
strategy of investment in brand image relative to companies that do not. 
 
H2b: The association between voluntary environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance is stronger for companies that emphasize a 
strategy of investment in research and development relative to companies 
that do not. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
4.1 Competitive Strategy and Voluntary Environmental Disclosure (H1) 
The first set of hypotheses predicts that competitive strategy is related to 
voluntary environmental disclosure. The discussions in Chapter III and prior literature 
suggest that a company’s VED decision is a function of the company’s competitive 
strategy, litigation risk, capital demand, leverage, size, other voluntary disclosures, and 
environmental performance. Therefore, the theoretical framework of this test is: 
Voluntary Environmental Disclosure  
= f (competitive strategy, litigation risk, capital demand, leverage, size, 
other voluntary disclosure, and environmental performance) 
The dependent variable, voluntary environmental disclosure (VEnvDisc), refers to the 
attributes of disclosures such as the extent of disclosure. The independent variable of 
interest is competitive strategy (Image or Technology). Other variables serve as control 
variables. They are defined later in this section. 
 The empirical model testing H1 is presented below: 
VEnvDisc = 0β  + 1β  Image + 2β  Technology + 3β  LitgRisk + 4β CapDema  
+ 5β Leverage + 6β Size + 7β OthDisc + 8β EnvPerf  + ε         (1) 
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4.1.1 Voluntary environmental disclosure 
 This study obtains voluntary environmental disclosure information from (1) the 
database of the CorporateRegister.com, and (2) a search of company websites for a 
separate section of environmental information.5 The inclusion of website disclosure 
responds to the trend of putting non-financial, non-audited information on the internet, 
especially for social and environmental information (Xiao et al. 2002). For U.S. 
companies, stand-alone environmental reports or similar reports and environmental 
information on the company website are considered voluntary disclosures. Both stand-
alone reports and environmental disclosures in a separate section of company website are 
important means to communicate to investors (SIRAN 2006).  
One objective of this study is to examine whether competitive strategy affects the 
relationship between actual environmental performance and voluntary disclosure about it. 
In this study, environmental performance is measured by the outcome of toxics 
management. The data available at the time of this study was for 2004. Therefore, the 
voluntary environmental disclosure is the first environmental or similar report (hereafter, 
environmental report) discussing 2004 performance. However, if a company published 
environmental reports annually till 2004, skipped the report in 2005, but published again 
in 2006 for previous years’ performance, this case is coded as no voluntary 
environmental disclosure for 2004 environmental performance.   
                                                 
5
 CorporateRegister.com is the most comprehensive database of corporate non-financial 
(environment/social/sustainability/CSR) reports in the world. It was established by Next Step Consulting in 
1998. The database is supported by leading organizations in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Socially Responsible Investment. The reports can be traced back to 1990. As of Apr. 18, 2006, the 
website has 11,067 reports from 3,175 different companies across 111 countries.  
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 This study adopts the disclosure checklist in Clarkson et al. (2006) as the coding 
scheme. The checklist is derived from the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2002 
published by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). In line with sustainable development, 
the Guidelines emphasize disclosures of economic, environmental, and social 
performance, which facilitate the decision–making of both reporting organizations and 
stakeholders. The goal of GRI is to have this disclosure framework accepted around the 
world. Therefore, completeness and comparability are given careful consideration in the 
development of the Guidelines. The disclosure checklist stemming from the Guidelines is 
broad enough to cover existing disclosure practices.  
 As shown in Appendix A, the coding list has 95 items. Each item is coded as 1 if 
it is present and 0 if it is absent. This checklist classifies voluntary environmental 
information into two sets – “Hard” and “Soft” disclosures. The “hard” set places 
emphasis on objective environmental information. It contains 79 items, grouped under 
four classifications, A1 – A4. The “hard” classifications address: governance mechanisms 
for environmental control (A1), the credibility of environmental disclosure (A2), actual 
environmental performance (A3), and environment-related financial information (A4). 
The presence of items in the “hard” set is indicative of good environmental citizenship. 
A company can accumulate points in the actual environmental performance 
group, A3, by providing information in ten environmental areas (e.g., energy use, water 
use, and toxics releases). See Appendix A for more detail. Disclosures about each area 
are evaluated in terms of the presence of 2004 performance, comparison with 
benchmarks (peer performance, previous performance, or performance target), and 
degree of detail (normalized or disaggregated). The rationale is that comparison and 
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details help investors to assess company environmental effort and possible environmental 
liabilities. Accordingly, the maximum score for an environmental area is six. The highest 
possible score for A3 is 60 and is obtained if the ten areas are discussed thoroughly.  
Here is an example of the coding. Johnson & Johnson presented its water use 
graphically. The graph showed that the water consumption was 10.9 million cubic meters 
in 2004, 12.3 in 2003, 13.0 in 2002, and 13.1 in 2001. This disclosure is awarded one 
point for reporting the consumption in 2004, and another point for the historical data for 
trend analysis. The consumption was indexed to sales (cubic meters/$1,000 sales). It was 
0.23, 0.29, 0.36, and 0.40 m3 per thousand dollars of sales for 2004 back to 2001, 
respectively. The disclosure is awarded one more point for the normalization. In addition, 
Johnson & Johnson set a goal of cumulative water use avoidance of ten percent from 
2001 to 2005.  By the end of 2004, the cumulative avoidance was 12.1 percent. This adds 
another point to the disclosure for comparison with the target. In total, Johnson & 
Johnson gets four points for its disclosure on water use. In contrast, The Dow Chemical 
Company scores only one point for its disclosure in this area. It described verbally the 
types of water included in the measure, but did not report usage by type. The information 
provided was the total water usage of 2,037 million cubic meters in 2004. 
 “Soft” disclosures include general environmental statements, captured by 16 
items, each coded as one point. They are vision and strategy claims (A5), environmental 
overviews (A6), and environmental initiatives (A7). Compared to “hard” set disclosures, 
these items are based on internal claims, evaluations and judgments. While “soft” 
disclosures may be well true, they lack the corroboration provided by hard data. They are 
also useful for a “greenwashing” strategy (Clarkson et al. 2006).  
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In summary, the highest possible score for “hard” disclosures is 79, and for “soft” 
disclosures is 16. Thus, the total possible score is 95. The dependent variable in model 
(1), VEnvDisc, is one of the four disclosure scores - Total, Hard, Soft, or A3.  
 
4.1.2 Competitive strategies 
The independent variables of interest are proxies for the two competitive 
strategies. This study calculates the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales for the year 
prior to VED. It also calculates the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales for the three years 
prior to VED, and then takes the average of the three ratios. An emphasis on investment 
in brand image (Image) is recognized when the advertising ratio is in the top one third of 
the industry. Recognition of an emphasis on investment in R&D (Technology) applies a 
similar rule. Companies with a R&D ratio in the top one third of the industry emphasize 
investment in R&D. An alternative way to define which competitive strategy is 
emphasized within a company is discussed later in sensitivity analyses. 
R&D expenditure and sales information are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The 
attempt to get advertising information first turns to COMPUSTAT. But only 27 out of 74 
chemical companies have the information. Advertising information is then obtained from 
“Advertising Ratios & Budgets” by Schonfeld & Associates (2005). Schonfeld & 
Associates, Inc., a business information researcher and seller since 1977, estimates 
company advertising spending using time series model, industry model, and constant 
ratio model. These estimates have already captured the advertising spending pattern of 
each company. Therefore, the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales is not an average 
like the final ratio of R&D to sales. 
 24 
The advertising data are used with caution. First, there is a potential upward bias 
for big companies. Scaling advertising expenditures by sales accommodates this issue. 
Second, for companies without sufficient historical reporting, the accuracy of advertising 
estimates relies on the similarity between the company and other companies in the same 
industry. This may reduce the variation of the advertising ratio, making it work against 
the hypotheses of this study. This issue makes the results more convincing.  
As predicted by the first set of hypotheses, the coefficients 1β  and 2β  should be 
significantly positive. A positive association between the competitive strategy proxy and 
the VED proxy indicates that companies with the tendency to emphasize either one of the 
strategies are likely to voluntarily disclose more environmental information than 
companies that do not emphasize the strategy. 
 
4.1.3 Control variables 
Based on prior research, several other variables are included in model (1) to 
control for factors expected to affect voluntary environmental disclosure. The control 
variables are litigation risk (LitgRisk), capital demand (CapDema), leverage (Leverage), 
company size (Size), other voluntary disclosures (OthDisc), and actual environmental 
performance (EnvPerf). The source of environmental performance information is 
discussed in the next section. Financial information is retrieved from COMPUSTAT. The 
number of news items released is counted from the website of each company. 
In environmental disclosure literature, litigation risk refers to the probability of 
being sued or being penalized due to poor environmental performance. Companies facing 
risk of legal actions are more likely to disclose environmental information (Gamble et al. 
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1995; Walden and Schwartz 1997; Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). Litigation risk, LitgRisk, is 
the total production-related toxics (in pounds) adjusted by the company’s total sales 
revenue (in thousand). This adjustment controls for the production process that 
determines pollution generation (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). A review of voluntary 
environmental disclosure studies reveals that normalizing environmental performance by 
sales is very common. Though Clarkson et al. (2006) use it as one of two environmental 
performance measures, they conclude that this measure and the percentage of toxics 
recycled measure capture complementary information. 
Prior literature also suggests that companies are inclined to voluntarily disclose 
extensive information if they anticipate accessing the capital market (Baiman and 
Verrecchia 1996; Lang and Lundholm 2000). This tendency could be extended to 
voluntary disclosure of environmental information. Similar to the proxy for industry 
dependence on external financing in Rajan and Zingales (1998), this study measures 
capital demand, CapDema, as 1 minus the ratio of cash flow from operations to capital 
expenditures. Greater value of CapDema means greater reliance on external capital. A 
positive association is expected between VEnvDisc and CapDema. 
Different reasons have been offered for including Leverage in environmental 
disclosure research. Some argue that environmental disclosure may reveal proprietary 
information and costs may be incurred because of that. Financially healthy companies 
have a good chance to absorb this cost (Cormier and Magnan 1999; Cormier and Magnan 
2003). Others maintain that debtholders are concerned about environmental liabilities 
when debt is relatively high, and that managers in these companies tend to satisfy this 
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demand for information (Clarkson et al. 2006). This study measures Leverage as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. The sign of Leverage is not clear. 
The control variable Size is included because large companies are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information due to visibility and political exposure 
(Cowen et al. 1987; Patten 1992; Hackston and Milne 1996; Bewley and Li 2000; Patten 
2002; Cormier and Magnan 2003). Size is defined as the nature logarithm of total assets. 
Size and VEnvDisc are expected to be positively related. 
To separate the impact of competitive strategy on VED, this study further controls 
for other factors that may influence voluntary disclosure decisions made by each 
company. Other voluntary disclosures, OthDisc, are measured as the number of news 
items released in the year of VED shown on the company website. VEnvDisc and 
OthDisc are expected to move in the same direction, provided that companies hold a 
consistent voluntary disclosure policy.  
This model also includes environmental performance as an independent variable. 
Prior research reports that companies with poor environmental performance tend to 
disclose more environmental information, especially in less environmentally sensitive 
industries (Patten 2002). Prior literature also finds that companies with good 
environmental performance tend to disclose more environmental information in order to 
signal their quality (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). The conflicting results may be due to the 
fact that the disclosures in these studies are a mix of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
in annual reports and 10Ks. As there are concerns for “greenwashing”, this study posits 
that poor performers present no less voluntary environmental disclosures than good 
performers. The specific measures are defined in the next section. 
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4.2 Competitive Strategy, Voluntary Environmental Disclosure Strategy, and Actual 
Environmental Performance (H2) 
The second set of hypotheses suggests that VED strategy is consistent with the 
competitive strategy. More specifically, the greenwashing strategy follows the investment 
in brand image strategy, whereas the strategy of informing investors follows the 
investment in R&D strategy. Different VED strategies lead to environmental disclosures 
with varying quality. Disclosure under the greenwashing strategy is expected to have a 
weak relation to the actual environmental performance. Disclosure under the strategy of 
informing investors is anticipated to be strongly linked to the actual environmental 
performance. The model is specified as follows: 
VEnvDisc = 0β  + 1β  Image + 2β  Technology + 3β  EnvPerf                 
+ 4β  EnvPerf * Image + 5β  EnvPerf * Technology + 6β  LitgRisk 
+ 7β  CapDema + 8β  Leverage + 9β  Size + 10β  OthDisc + ε  
                (2) 
 
4.2.1 Environmental performance 
  The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) 
authorized the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to collect toxics release and 
transfer information. This Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program began in 1987 and 
expanded later under the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. With two decades of 
development, the TRI program provides the most comparable information available 
regarding environmental performance.  
 The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 mandates that companies report additional 
information on toxics management and source reduction practices to the EPA. Total 
production-related toxics are recycled, treated, combusted for energy recovery, or 
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disposed of or otherwise released. Recycling recovers toxics for reuse. Treating is to 
destroy toxic chemicals by processes. Combusting is to burn toxics to recover energy. 
Disposing or releasing is to send toxics to underground injection wells, landfills, and 
other media. Of all these management approaches, recycling is the best in terms of 
environmental protection and resource conservation. When environmental contamination 
is the concern, recycling, treating, and combusting are all desired management activities, 
while disposing or releasing is less desirable.  
The ratios of toxic waste recycled to total production-related toxics (Recycled), 
toxic waste treated to total production-related toxics (Treated), and toxic waste for energy 
recovery to total production-related toxics (Combusted) represent competing toxics 
management methods. Higher ratio values indicate better environmental performance. 
The ratio of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released to total production-related 
toxics (Disposed) equals one minus the total of Recycled, Treated, and Combusted. As 
opposed to the three previous ratios, lower values of Disposed are better.  
This study uses Recycled and Disposed as proxies for environmental performance. 
Toxics recycled reflect the spirit of good environmental performance, i.e., pollution 
minimization, resource conservation, and waste reduction (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). With 
future profitability information embedded, Recycled has implications for sustainability. 
Toxics disposed of or otherwise released partly determine the extent of environmental 
contamination. Consequently, Disposed has implications for environmental liabilities. 
Other variables in the model are defined as those in section 4.1. 
When the performance variable is Recycled, the second set of hypotheses predicts 
4β  to have a negative sign, but 5β  to have a positive sign. When the performance 
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variable is Disposed, 4β  is to be positive while 5β  is to be negative. If the results are 
consistent with the predictions, it means that the disclosures are less useful if they are 
from companies emphasizing investment in brand image compared to those from other 
companies. The disclosures are more likely to be helpful to estimate actual environmental 
performance if they are from companies emphasizing investment in R&D relative to 
those from other companies. 
 
4.3 Sample Selection 
 This study starts with all non-federal chemical facilities that report toxics 
management activities to the U.S. EPA. The EPA database includes 3,556 facilities, 
whose Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes begin with 28. Among them, 559 
facilities reported either an amount of zero or that the amount of toxics did not reach the 
reporting threshold for 2004. The remaining 2,997 facilities belong to 231 U.S. public 
companies and some foreign companies. The foreign companies are dropped because 
they are subject to different sets of regulation. Also excluded are 111 U.S. companies 
whose primary business is not in the chemical industry, since their production structure 
may not be comparable to that of chemical companies. Remaining are 120 U.S. public 
chemical companies (two-digit SIC = 28: chemicals & allied products). The sample size 
further deceases due to the lack of: advertising information (15 companies), research and 
development information (6 companies), or both (25 companies). The final sample 
includes 74 observations, which are listed in Appendix B.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
ANALYSES 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in this study. Panel A 
reports the VED scores for the 45 companies that make disclosures. It shows that among 
companies providing VED, the disclosures vary substantially. The Total disclosure scores 
range from 1 to 59, and the median (mean) score is 17 (19.8). This result is comparable to 
the median (mean) of 17 (18.95) for 41 chemical companies in Clarkson et al. (2006). 
The variation in Total mostly comes from Hard disclosures. The standard deviation of 
Hard disclosures is 14.023, while the standard deviation of Soft disclosures is 2.791. 
Examining the four groups within the Hard set suggests that the main contributor to the 
variation is A3 (environmental performance). Its standard deviation is 11.115. Panel B in 
Table 1 reports VED scores for the full sample. The median (mean) drops from 17 (19.8) 
to 3.5 (12.054) for Total, from 12 (14.8) to 1.5 (8.973) for Hard, from 5 (5.1) to 2 (3.081) 
for Soft, and from 5 (9.7) to 0 (5.878) for A3.  
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for other variables. The competitive strategy 
measures are Image and Technology. They are defined based on the advertising-sales 
ratio (Advertising) and R&D-sales ratio (R&D). The median advertising expenditure of 
the sample is 1.3 percent of sales revenue. The mean expenditure is 2.9 percent of sales 
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revenue. Sample firms spent more on R&D than advertising. The median R&D 
expenditure is 3 percent of sales revenue, and the mean is 6.4 percent of sales revenue. 
As defined in section 4.1.2, Image and Technology are dummy variables. They have the 
same median of 0 and mean of 0.338. 
The sample firms face different litigation risks due to environmental performance. 
The median (mean) of LitgRisk is 0.947 (11.506) pounds of toxics per thousand dollars of 
sales. The median (mean) of CapDema is -1.618 (-1.776), indicating that these sample 
firms generate enough internal cash to finance their capital expenditures. Consequently, 
the debt to asset ratio, Leverage, has a relatively low median (mean) of 0.253 (0.298). 
The natural logarithm of total assets, Size, has a median (mean) of 8.020 (7.907). The 
median (mean) number of voluntary news items released, OthDisc, is 30 (45.892) in the 
VED year.  
The management of production-related toxics is also reported. Based on the 
medians (means), 5.3 percent (22 percent) of the production-related toxics are recycled 
and 4.3 percent (16.3 percent) are disposed of or otherwise released. These numbers 
suggest that sample firms still have a lot to do to catch up with the national level of 36.5 
percent for recycling, the best management method in terms of environmental protection 
and resource conservation.  
 Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the independent variables. The two 
competitive strategy measures, Image and Technology, are positively correlated, and their 
correlation is moderate. Except the correlation between Size and OthDisc, the rest 
correlation coefficients show that the independent variables are not highly correlated, 
suggesting low possibility of multicollinearity.  
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5.2 Hypothesis Testing 
5.2.1 Results for H1 
Table 3 presents the results of hypothesis testing. Panel A uses Recycled as the 
proxy for environmental performance. The dependent variables are different VEnvDisc 
measures, as labeled on the top of each section. Panel A shows that the coefficient on 
Image is positive and significant when the dependent variable is Total, Hard, or A3 
(environmental performance). The results provide support to Hypothesis 1a that 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to voluntarily publish more 
environmental information than companies that do not emphasize this strategy.  
Hypothesis 1b predicts that companies emphasizing investment in R&D are likely 
to voluntarily disclose more environmental information than companies that do not 
emphasize this strategy. When Soft or Total is the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
Technology is not statistically significant, suggesting that companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D are unlikely to provide more “soft” environmental information and 
environmental information in general. However, when A3 or Hard is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on Technology is significantly positive, indicating these 
companies tend to provide more environmental performance information and information 
that shows long-term commitment to environmental protection. 
Among other variables, CapDema, Size, and OthDisc are significantly positive. A 
positive coefficient on CapDema suggests that companies relying on external funds 
disclose more environmental information than companies generating enough internal 
cash for capital expenditure. Large firms are under relatively more public pressure than 
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small firms are. They voluntarily disclose more environmental information. Also note 
that companies have a consistent voluntary disclosure policy, as evidenced by positive 
coefficients on OthDisc. If companies tend to voluntarily disclose news such as product 
development and management forecasts, they also tend to voluntarily disclose 
environment-related issues. 
The LitgRisk variable has no significant association with VEnvDisc measures. 
This suggests that in the chemical industry, litigation risk due to poor environmental 
performance does not encourage VED. Two conflicting expectations exist with respect to 
the relationship between Leverage and VEnvDisc. One predicts a negative association, 
arguing that financially healthy companies are able to absorb proprietary costs related to 
VED. The other expects a positive association, stating that companies try to satisfy 
creditors’ desire to assess future environmental liabilities. The non-significance of 
Leverage does not support either of these explanations. The coefficients on the 
environmental performance proxy, Recycled, are not significant. It seems the 
performance in recycling is not related to VED.  
The results are basically the same in Panel B, where Disposed is the 
environmental performance measure. One exception is that Technology is not 
significantly associated with Hard but still positively related to A3 in this Panel. The 
other exception is that Disposed is negatively related to Hard. Companies releasing a 
small amount of toxics to the environment are likely to voluntarily disclose more 
environmental information demonstrating long-term commitments. Since Disposed has 
implications for environmental liabilities, companies seem to be cautious in this regard. 
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5.2.2 Results for H2 
Table 4 presents the association between VED and actual environmental 
performance under the influence of competitive strategy. Panel A reports the results when 
Recycled is the environmental performance proxy. The coefficient of Recycled is not 
significant, suggesting there is no association between VED and environmental 
performance for companies that do not emphasize the two strategies. When the two 
competitive strategies are involved, the relationship between VED and environmental 
performance is altered. The signs of the interaction terms Recycled*Image are 
significantly negative. This indicates that the relationship between VED and 
environmental performance is more negative for companies emphasizing investment in 
brand image compared to other companies. The VED of these companies is more likely 
to associate with poor environmental performance. In contrast, the signs of the interaction 
terms Recycled*Technology are significantly positive. The VED of companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D is more likely to associate with good environmental 
performance compared to other companies, consistent with the comment of a “reliable” 
indicator by Berthelot et al. (2003). The association between VED and environmental 
performance is weaker for companies emphasizing investment in brand image, and is 
stronger for companies emphasizing investment in R&D. 
Panel B of this table uses Disposed as the proxy for environmental performance. 
Disposed measures the proportion of toxics sent to underground injection wells, landfills, 
and other media. A smaller value of Disposed indicates better performance. Disposed is 
positively related to Soft, suggesting that more “soft” environmental information relates 
to poor environmental performance for companies without an emphasis on Image or 
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Technology. The interaction terms Disposed *Image are negatively related to VED 
scores, and the interaction terms Disposed*Technology are insignificant. The two 
competitive strategies have different impacts on the association between VED and 
environmental performance. 
 
 5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 This section presents the results of additional tests. The new tests investigate 
whether the results in section 5.2 are sensitive to changes in measurement methods and 
econometric specifications. Details are presented below. 
5.3.1 Variations of Image and Technology based on advertising ratio and R&D ratio, 
respectively 
Table 5 and Table 6 classify companies with an advertising-to-sales ratio above 
the industry median as companies emphasizing investment in brand image. They also 
categorize companies with a R&D-to-sales ratio above the industry median as companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D. Table 5 shows that companies emphasizing investment 
in brand image are likely to offer more VED, both “hard” and “soft” environmental 
information, than companies that do not emphasize this strategy. Companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D have a tendency to provide more environmental performance 
information. In Table 6, the results about the influence of competitive strategy on the 
association between VED and environmental performance are similar to what Table 4 has 
reported. When Recycled is the environmental performance proxy, its coefficient is not 
significant; the coefficient of Recycled*Image is negative; and the coefficient of 
Recycled*Technology is generally positive. The coefficient of Disposed is positive when 
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Soft is the dependent variable. The coefficient of Disposed*Image is negative. The 
coefficient of Disposed*Technology is not significant. 
Table 7 and Table 8 report the hypothesis testing results using advertising ratio 
and R&D ratio directly. A high advertising ratio indicates an emphasis on the strategy of 
investment in brand image. Similarly, a high R&D ratio indicates an emphasis on the 
strategy of investment in R&D. Table 7 shows that companies emphasizing investment in 
brand image are likely to make more VED. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D 
are likely to provide more environmental performance information (i.e., A3). In this table, 
VED scores have no association with Recycled, but negative links are between Hard and 
Disposed and between A3 and Disposed.   
Table 8 suggests that the association between VED score and environmental 
performance is affected by competitive strategy. Panel A shows that Total and Recycled 
are negatively associated. So are Soft and Recycled. They suggest for companies with no 
advertising or R&D expenditure, more VED are related to poor environmental 
performance. The coefficients are not significant for Recycled*Image, indicating 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image do not significantly change the 
negative association between VED and environmental performance. The coefficients are 
significantly positive for Recycled*Technology, suggesting companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D are more likely to correct the general negative association. In other 
words, their VED have a tendency to relate to good environmental performance. Panel B 
present similar results to those reported in Table 4.  
The next two tables present the results when all variables are ranked in the 
ascending order. Regarding the competitive strategy measures, Image is the rank of 
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Advertising within the industry, and Technology is the rank of R&D within the industry. 
Table 9 reports that companies emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to 
provide more environmental performance information or “hard” environmental 
information in general. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D are unlikely to 
provide more environmental information than companies that do not emphasize this 
strategy. Table 10 reports the association between VED and environmental performance 
under the influence of competitive strategy. Panel A shows that VED measures, Total, 
Hard, and Soft, are not significantly related to Recycled, but A3 and Recycled are 
negatively related. Variable Recycled*Image associates with none of the VED measures, 
whereas Recycled*Technology positively relates to all the VED measures. Panel B shows 
that the coefficients on Disposed and the interaction terms are not significant.  
5.3.2 Considering the tension between the two competitive strategies within a 
company 
Whether a company emphasizes a competitive strategy or not depends on its 
position in the industry in terms of advertising spending or R&D expenditure. The 
tendency of emphasizing a competitive strategy increases with the value of advertising 
spending or R&D expenditure. The above tests have defined “emphasizing a competitive 
strategy” in this way. The tests below adopt another way to define it:  
• Compute the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales for the year prior to 
VED;  
• Calculate the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales for the three years prior to 
VED and then take the average of the three ratios;  
• Subtract the advertising ratio from the final R&D ratio for each company;  
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• Sort the differences of the ratios in a descending order;  
• If the value falls in the lower one third range, it means the strategy of 
investment in brand image dominates the strategy of investment in R&D. The 
proxy for investment in brand image, Image, equals 1, and 0 otherwise;  
• If the value falls in the upper one third range, it indicates the opposite that the 
strategy of investment in R&D prevails. The proxy for investment in R&D, 
Technology, equals 1, and 0 otherwise.  
This approach intends to capture the tension between the two competitive 
strategies within a company and the industry norm. As H2a and H2b predict, the two 
competitive strategies lead to different association between VED and environmental 
performance. A company’s VED should reflect the impacts of both strategies, but the 
overall association between VED and environmental performance should be salient for 
the dominant strategy. For example, Eli Lilly and Company has an advertising ratio of 5 
percent, and its R&D ratio is 20.4 percent on average. They are all ranked in the top one 
third of the industry. So both competitive strategies are important to the company. As 
investment in R&D is likely to dominate investment in brand image, the association 
between VED and environmental performance could be affected more by the strategy of 
investment in R&D. 
The testing results are presented in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 suggests that 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to make more “soft” 
environmental disclosures such as general environmental statements than other 
companies. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D are likely to voluntarily disclose 
more environmental information in total. The information disclosed is primarily “hard” 
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information showing their long-term commitments to improving environmental 
performance. These companies also make significantly more voluntary environmental 
disclosures about their actual environmental performance. In this table, VED is not 
related to Recycled. But Hard is negatively related to Disposed. 
In Panel A of Table 12, Recycled is negatively related to Total, Hard, and Soft. 
For companies that do not emphasize the two competitive strategies, more VED relates to 
poor environmental performance. This indicates that VED is to enhance public relations, 
supporting the claim of “greenwashing”. Two more independent variables of interest are 
the interaction terms. The results show for companies emphasizing investment in brand 
image, the association between their VED and environmental performance is not 
significantly different from that of companies without an emphasis on the two strategies. 
In contrast, the signs of the interaction term Recycled*Technology are positive. It 
suggests that companies emphasizing investment in R&D are more inclined to correct the 
negative association than other companies. Panel A suggests that different competitive 
strategies have different effects on the association between VED and environmental 
performance. 
Panel B of this table uses Disposed as the proxy for environmental performance. 
The coefficients of Disposed are significantly positive, indicating again more VED are 
related to poor environmental performance. However, both interaction terms are 
negatively related to VED. Therefore, this undesirable relation is weaker for companies 
emphasizing either one of the strategies. One explanation is that the public is sensitive to 
Disposed; hence, when these companies make VED, they consider their performance on 
disposing toxics. 
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This study has also tried the Tobit models since the dependent variables are 
greater than or equal to zero. The results are presented in Table 13 and Table 14. As 
reported above, companies emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to 
voluntarily disclose more “soft” environmental information than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D are likely to 
voluntarily disclose more detailed environmental performance information, “hard” 
environmental information, and environmental information in total. In the examination of 
competitive strategy’s effects on the association between VED and environmental 
performance, interaction terms Recycled*Image are not significant, whereas interaction 
terms Recycled*Technology are significantly positive. In Panel B of Table 14, only Total 
and Soft are negatively associated with Disposed*Image, while all VED proxies are 
negatively connected with Disposed*Technology. 
So far the hypothesis testing has included both stand-alone environmental reports 
and environmental disclosures on company websites. The publication dates of stand-
alone environmental reports were accurately determined; these dates were prior to the 
EPA release of the toxics data. When the disclosures on the company websites were 
coded, many websites had not updated information for 2005 performance. If they had, the 
VED scores were discounted to reflect disclosures made when only 2004 environmental 
performance information was available. However, the coding was conducted after the 
2004 TRI data were released by the EPA. At that time 2005 environmental performance 
information might be available within companies. It is difficult to determine whether the 
VED about 2004 performance was put on the company website because companies 
wanted to show 2005 performance, or it was already there when only the 2004 
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performance data were available. If the former happens, the VED measures may be 
positively biased because of the inclusion of website disclosures. To accommodate this 
concern, website disclosures are treated as no disclosure. The results are basically the 
same after the change. The exception is that companies emphasizing investment in brand 
image are now unlikely to disclose more “soft” environmental information than 
companies that do not emphasize this strategy. Detailed information is presented in 
Tables 15 and 16.  
Logit models are used when the VED score Total is re-defined as a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if Total is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
variable specification of Total leads to a loss of information. In the tests of H1a and H1b, 
Table 17 reports that none of the competitive strategy measures are positive, neither is 
OthDisc. LitgRisk is positively significant in Panel A but not in Panel B. Regarding the 
rest variables, CapDema and Size remain positive, and Leverage is still not significant. A 
negative association is reported between the decision of VED and Recycled. It means that 
offering VED relates to poor environmental performance. But the decision of VED does 
not significantly relate to Disposed. Table 18 reports the testing results of H2a and H2b. 
The coefficient of Recycled is negative. The interaction term Recycled*Image is not 
significant, while the interaction term Recycled*Technology is positive. When Disposed 
is the environmental performance measure, none of the three variables, Disposed, 
Disposed*Image, and Disposed*Technology, are significant.   
5.3.3 Variations of environmental performance measures 
Production-related toxics are recycled, treated, combusted, or disposed of. In this 
section, the toxics amount managed by each method is divided by sales revenue for size-
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adjustment. Mathematically, these measures are the components of the environmental 
litigation risk measure LitgRisk. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, the variable 
LitgRisk is dropped in the tests below. 
 Tables 19 and 20 use these new environmental performance measures and the 
competitive strategy measures defined in section 4.1.2. Each table includes four panels, 
corresponding to the four management methods, recycling, treating, combusting, and 
disposing of. Table 19 shows that companies emphasizing either one of the two 
competitive strategies tend to disclose more environmental performance information, and 
“hard” environmental information. Companies emphasizing investment in brand image 
also tend to disclose more environmental information in total than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy. More “soft” environmental disclosures are related to poor 
environmental performance measured by Recycled or good environmental performance 
measured by Combusted. 
Panel A of Table 20 reports a negative association between Soft and Recycled, but 
no association between other VED measures and Recycled. Across all VED measures, the 
association between VED and environmental performance is more negative for 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image compared to other companies; the 
association is more positive for companies emphasizing investment in R&D compared to 
other companies. Panel B shows that the coefficients on environmental performance 
measure Treated are not significant. The association between VED and environmental 
performance represented by Treated is more positive for companies emphasizing either 
one of the competitive strategies relative to other companies. Panel C has Combusted as 
the environmental performance measure. The coefficients of this variable are not 
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significant. But the association between VED and environmental performance has a slight 
tendency to move in the negative direction under the strategy of investment in brand 
image. Panel D uses Disposed as the environmental performance proxy. The coefficients 
of this variable are negative, indicating more VED relates to good environmental 
performance shown by Disposed. This association is not significantly different for 
companies emphasizing investment in brand image, but is weaker for companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D. 
Tables 21 and 22 take the new environmental performance measures and the 
competitive strategy measures defined in section 5.3.2. Table 21 reports that companies 
emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to make more “soft” environmental 
disclosures than companies that do not emphasize this strategy. Companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D are likely to make more environmental disclosures driven by “hard” 
environmental information, especially environmental performance information.  
Panel A of Table 22 reports when soft is the dependent variable, the coefficient of 
Recycled is negative. The coefficients are not significant when other VED scores are 
used. But the association between A3 and Recycled is more positive under the strategy of 
investment in brand image. Panel B reports that more VED associates with poor 
environmental performance measured by Treated for companies not emphasizing the two 
competitive strategies. The association is not significantly different for companies 
emphasizing investment in brand image, whereas the association is ameliorated for 
companies emphasizing investment in R&D. When Combusted is used as the 
environmental performance proxy in Panel C, more A3 relates to poor environmental 
performance for other companies. Compared to this association, the association between 
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VED and environmental performance is more positive for companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D but not for companies emphasizing investment in brand image. Panel 
D shows that the coefficients of Disposed are negative. The association between VED 
and environmental performance is not significantly different for companies emphasizing 
either one of the competitive strategies relative to other companies. 
Recycling, treating, and combusting toxics alleviate the extent of environmental 
contamination. Hence, these three methods are considered desirable management 
methods. A new environmental performance measure, Desired, is constructed by adding 
together the scaled Recycled, Treated, and Combusted defined above. High values of 
Desired indicate good environmental performance. The competitive strategy measures in 
Tables 23 and 24 follow the definitions in section 4.1.2. Table 23 reports that companies 
emphasizing either one of the competitive strategies have a propensity to disclose more 
environmental information. Table 24 shows that VED and environmental performance 
are not significantly related for companies without an emphasis on Image or Technology. 
This relation is not significantly different for companies emphasizing investment in brand 
image. The relation, however, is significantly more positive for companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D.  
The competitive strategy measures in Tables 25 and 26 are changed to the 
definitions developed in section 5.3.2. Table 25 shows that companies emphasizing 
investment in brand image tend to focus on “soft” environmental information. Companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D tend to report on environmental performance 
information, “hard” environmental information, and environmental information in total. 
Table 26 has VED associates with poor environmental performance for companies with 
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no emphasis on the two competitive strategies. This association is not significantly 
changed for companies emphasizing investment in brand image, but it moves in the 
positive direction for companies emphasizing investment in R&D. 
5.3.4 Including a fixed effect for pharmaceutical companies 
 The final sample of this study contains 74 chemical companies. Among them, 18 
are pharmaceutical companies (SIC = 2834). To examine whether the results are driven 
by this group of companies, this study adds a dummy variable, Pharmaceutical, to the 
models. This variable equals 1 if a company’s SIC code is 2834, and 0 otherwise. Tables 
27 and 28 take the competitive strategy measures defined in section 4.1.2. The results are 
basically the same as those reported in Tables 3 and 4. Tables 29 and 30 use the 
competitive strategy measures defined in section 5.3.2. Their results are basically the 
same as those reported in Tables 11 and 12.   
 
5.4 Summary 
Several themes emerge from the analyses in this Chapter. First, companies 
emphasizing investment in brand image are likely to provide more environmental 
information than companies that do not emphasize this strategy. Companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D tend to provide more environmental performance information than 
companies that do not emphasize this strategy.  
Second, different competitive strategies affect the association between VED and 
environmental performance differently. Some companies emphasize investment in brand 
image. If the environmental performance measure has implications for sustainability 
(e.g., Recycled), the association between VED and environmental performance is the 
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same or more negative for these companies relative to other companies. If the 
environmental performance measure has implications for environmental liabilities (e.g., 
Disposed), the association between VED and environmental performance is adjusted, so 
VED is less likely to relate to poor environmental performance.  
Third, for companies emphasizing investment in R&D, the tendency of VED to be 
linked to poor environmental performance is ameliorated. In other words, the association 
between VED and environmental performance is stronger for these R&D companies than 
for other companies. This association is also stronger if the environmental performance 
measure has implications for sustainability than if the environmental performance 
measure has implications for environmental liabilities. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The overall objective of this study is to further our understanding of voluntary 
disclosure decisions. In the context of voluntary environmental disclosure, this study 
investigates whether a company’s competitive strategy affects its VED decision, and also 
influences the quality of disclosed environmental information. This investigation is 
important, given the rapid growth in socially responsible investment.  
This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by testing whether 
competitive strategy affects company disclosure policy. Prior studies have identified 
many factors influencing disclosure decisions but competitive strategy has been ignored 
by them. This study finds that a company’s competitive strategy affect its voluntary 
environmental disclosure. Companies emphasizing investment in brand image are likely 
to voluntarily disclose more environmental information than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy. Companies emphasizing investment in R&D in general also tend 
to voluntarily provide more environmental information than companies that do not 
emphasize the strategy. Their disclosures focus on environmental performance. This 
study also finds that VED positively relate to other voluntary disclosures made by the 
company. It suggests that companies may have consistent voluntary disclosure policies 
that are also influenced by competitive strategy. Future research should consider 
including competitive strategy as a determinant of voluntary disclosure decisions.
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This study investigates specific competitive strategies. It addresses the problem 
that may be caused by using a general competitive strategy variable such as industry 
competition intensity. As shown by the results, different competitive strategies have 
different effects on VED strategy. If a general competitive strategy variable is used, the 
effect of competitive strategy on disclosures may appear unstable. 
Investigating specific competitive strategies further provides insight into the 
conflicting relation between VED and environmental performance. The results of this 
study indicate that for companies that do not emphasize the two competitive strategies, 
more VED do not relate to good environmental performance, leading to concerns of 
“greenwashing”. When the environmental performance measure has implications for 
sustainability, the association between VED and environmental performance is not 
stronger for companies emphasizing investment in brand image relative to other 
companies. This association, however, is significantly stronger for companies 
emphasizing investment in R&D relative to other companies. When the environmental 
performance measure has implications for environmental liabilities, the association 
between VED and environmental performance is stronger for companies emphasizing 
investment in brand image, and is the same or stronger for companies emphasizing 
investment in R&D, compared to other companies.  
These findings suggest that competitive strategy is a signal of the quality of 
disclosed environmental information. Investors can use a company’s competitive strategy 
as a heuristic measure to estimate the company’s environmental performance and the 
financial implications of the performance. This method should save investors time and 
costs in collecting actual environmental performance data. 
 49 
The results in this study are limited by features of the data and the methodology. 
First, this study examines only the chemical industry and the sample size is relatively 
small. It is not clear whether the findings could be generalized to other industries. 
However, focusing on one industry controls for unknown factors that may affect 
voluntary disclosure decisions and vary from industry to industry, making the tests of 
competitive strategy powerful. Second, research on voluntary disclosures is usually 
charged with subjectivity in coding. The VED scores in this study may contain 
measurement errors for this reason. This study uses a disclosure checklist to help control 
measurement errors. The scores are comparable to those in a study using the same 
checklist. Third, environmental performance is measured by toxics management 
outcomes, and performance in other environmental areas may also affect VED. This 
study follows the literature to use TRI information, because performance in other areas is 
difficult to evaluate. Also because of this, its influence on VED may not be comparable 
to that of toxics management information. Toxics management information is reported 
under the TRI program, and the EPA has managed the program for 20 years. The 
information is publicly accessible and of high quality.  
Future research could develop new environmental performance measures that 
capture performance in multiple environmental areas, and then examine the relation 
between VED and environmental performance. Industries other than the chemical 
industry could also be examined. It may be that additional data and/or harder disclosure 
measures become available. This would enable a closer look at the relationship among 
competitive strategy, voluntary environmental disclosure, and environmental 
performance. Finally, future studies could examine whether investors assign different 
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values to different quality of environmental disclosures. The results may suggest whether 
there would be a demand for regulatory guidance on environmental reporting and 
reporting assurance service.
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TABLES 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
         
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for 45 Disclosure Scores 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Total 45 19.8 16.375 1 5 17 30 59 
Hard 45 14.8 14.023 0 2 12 23 50 
Soft 45 5.1 2.791 1 3 5 7 11 
A3 45 9.7 11.115 0 0 5 16 40 
A1 45 1.9 1.498 0 1 2 3 5 
A2 45 2.5 1.938 0 1 2 4 7 
A4 45 0.6 0.908 0 0 0 1 3 
A5 45 2.7 1.408 0 2 3 4 6 
A6 45 0.6 0.747 0 0 0 1 3 
A7 45 1.7 1.286 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for 74 Disclosure Scores 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Total 74 12.054 16.017 0 0 3.5 24 59 
Hard 74 8.973 13.081 0 0 1.5 18 50 
Soft 74 3.081 3.301 0 0 2 5 11 
A3 74 5.878 9.851 0 0 0 11 40 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Advertising 74 0.029 0.045 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.038 0.251 
R&D 74 0.064 0.073 0.000 0.016 0.030 0.096 0.321 
Image 74 0.338 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Technology 74 0.338 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LitgRisk 74 11.506 26.013 0.000 0.190 0.947 9.170 146.752 
CapDema 74 -1.776 2.797 -8.749 -3.249 -1.618 -0.480 11.069 
Leverage 74 0.298 0.206 0.000 0.183 0.253 0.396 1.363 
Size 74 7.907 1.802 2.350 7.000 8.020 9.050 11.675 
OthDisc 74 45.892 34.623 3.000 20.000 30.000 70.000 139.000 
Recycled 74 0.220 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.371 0.997 
Disposed 74 0.163 0.275 0.000 0.018 0.043 0.153 1.000 
         
 
 
Total:  the total score for VED, based on the disclosure coding scheme in the 
Appendix; equals “Hard” plus “Soft”; 
Hard:  sum of VED scores for sections A1, A2, A3, and A4 of the disclosure 
coding scheme;  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Soft:  sum of VED scores for sections A5, A6, and A7 of the disclosure coding 
scheme; 
A1:  score for VED regarding governance structure and management systems; 
A2:  score for VED regarding the credibility of information; 
A3:  score for VED regarding actual environmental performance; 
A4:  score for VED regarding environmental spending; 
A5:  score for VED regarding environmental vision and strategy claims; 
A6:  score for VED regarding environmental profile; 
A7:  score for VED regarding environmental initiatives; 
Advertising: estimated advertising expenditure prior to the year of VED divided by the 
sales revenue of the same year; the advertising expenditure is estimated 
using time-series model, industry model, and constant ratio model by 
Schonfeld & Associates, Inc.; 
R&D:  first measured by the ratio of R&D to sales revenue for the three years prior 
to the year of VED, and then averaged for the three values; 
Image:  equals 1 if the ratio of advertising to sales for the year prior to VED is in the 
top one third of the industry, and 0 otherwise; 
Technology:  equals 1 if the average of the yearly ratio of R&D to sales over the three 
years preceding the year of VED is in the top one third of the industry, and 0 
otherwise; 
(continued on next page) 
 54 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
LitgRisk:  total production-related toxics (in pounds) adjusted by the company’s total 
sales revenue (in thousand); 
CapDema:  1 minus the ratio of cash flow from operations to capital expenditures; 
Leverage:  the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
Size:  the nature logarithm of the total assets; 
OthDisc:  the number of news released in the year of VED on the company website; 
Recycled:  the ratios of toxic waste recycled to total production-related toxics for 2004; 
Disposed:  the ratio of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released to total production-
related toxics for 2004. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlations between Independent Variables 
   
 
    
 
   
Variable Image Technology  LitgRisk CapDema Leverage Size  OthDisc Recycled Disposed 
Image 
  0.336  -0.299  -0.233  -0.039  0.059  0.085  -0.119  0.149 
 
  0.0035  0.0098  0.0455  0.7442  0.6171  0.4741  0.3117  0.2037 
Technology 0.336    -0.202  -0.170  -0.372  0.112  0.176  -0.187  -0.060 
 0.0035    0.0850  0.1484  0.0011  0.3435  0.1339  0.1109  0.6092 
LitgRisk -0.493  -0.346    0.349  0.026  -0.174  -0.103  0.332  -0.165 
 0.0000  0.0025    0.0023  0.8290  0.1381  0.3805  0.0038  0.1589 
CapDema -0.280  -0.244  0.189    0.147  -0.442  -0.200  0.094  -0.069 
 0.0156  0.0361  0.1076    0.2129  0.0001  0.0883  0.4272  0.5584 
Leverage -0.134  -0.418  0.182  0.055    -0.037  -0.137  -0.036  0.149 
 0.2535  0.0002  0.1212  0.6422    0.7569  0.2460  0.7589  0.2039 
Size 0.023  0.132  -0.004  -0.328  -0.084    0.679  -0.030  -0.117 
 0.8431  0.2631  0.9743  0.0044  0.4784    0.0001  0.8026  0.3199 
OthDisc 0.093  0.187  0.085  -0.258  -0.087  0.703    -0.144  -0.179 
 0.4307  0.1100  0.4701  0.0268  0.4600  0.0001    0.2198  0.1281 
Recycled -0.242  -0.270  0.420  0.099  0.105  0.197  0.029    -0.250 
 0.0378  0.0201  0.0002  0.3994  0.3724  0.0933  0.8093    0.0319 
Disposed -0.092  -0.271  -0.142  -0.008  0.181  -0.147  -0.074  -0.106   
 0.4341  0.0196  0.2271  0.9488  0.1224  0.2112  0.5316  0.3680   
 
                 
 
Pearson correlations above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below the diagonal; p-values are under the correlation coefficients. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Determining Image and 
Technology Using the Top One Third of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, 
Respectively 
 
Panel A: Recycled 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.846 ***  -25.319 ***  -4.527 ***  -19.852 *** 
 
 -5.203   -5.384   -3.513   -5.321  
Image (+) 3.986 *   3.767 **   0.219     3.190 ** 
 
 1.437     1.697     0.347     1.768   
Technology (+) 2.792     2.939 *   -0.146     3.634 ** 
 
 1.066     1.393     -0.235     2.030   
LitgRisk (+) 0.001   0.002   -0.001   -0.002  
 
 0.048   0.096   -0.084   -0.090  
CapDema (+) 1.558 ***  1.207 ***  0.351 ***  0.794 *** 
 
 3.394   3.369   2.903   2.787  
Leverage ? -1.309   -0.883   -0.426   0.841  
 
 -0.176   -0.159   -0.208   0.205  
Size (+) 4.149 ***  3.293 ***  0.855 ***  2.377 *** 
 
 4.704   4.642   4.101   4.284  
OthDisc (+) 0.217 ***  0.181 ***  0.036 ***  0.123 *** 
  5.110   5.112   3.599   4.027  
Recycled (-/0) 0.260   0.744   -0.484   1.253  
 
 0.083   0.306   -0.541   0.634  
             
Adj. R2  0.659   0.674   0.473   0.617  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.697 ***  -24.245 ***  -4.452 ***  -19.112 *** 
 
 -5.192   -5.391   -3.409   -5.268  
Image (+) 4.453 *   4.220 **   0.234     3.526 ** 
 
 1.628     1.915     0.372     1.945   
Technology (+) 2.528     2.639     -0.111     3.351 ** 
 
 0.977     1.273     -0.181     1.909   
LitgRisk (+) -0.006   -0.002   -0.003   -0.002  
 
 -0.222   -0.126   -0.408   -0.120  
CapDema (+) 1.516 ***  1.170 ***  0.346 ***  0.772 *** 
 
 3.506   3.536   2.799   2.898  
Leverage ? -0.497   -0.235   -0.262   1.124  
 
 -0.075   -0.049   -0.130   0.314  
Size (+) 4.092 ***  3.260 ***  0.832 ***  2.383 *** 
 
 4.778   4.766   4.013   4.456  
OthDisc (+) 0.210 ***  0.173 ***  0.037 ***  0.116 *** 
  4.995   4.937   3.792   3.840  
Disposed (+/0) -5.336   -4.924 **  -0.413   -3.302  
 
 -1.559   -1.958   -0.364   -1.618  
             
Adj. R2  0.667   0.685   0.473   0.624  
N  74   74   74   74  
  
           
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
A company’s competitive strategy is determined by the following procedure: 
• Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales prior to the year of VED; 
• Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of VED; 
Image:  equals 1 if the advertising ratio is in the top one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Technology:  equals 1 if the R&D ratio is in the top one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental 
Performance – Determining Image and Technology Using the Top One Third of 
Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
Panel A: Recycled 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
  Total  
 
Hard  
 
Soft  
 
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.  
 
Coef.  
 
Coef.  
 
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.550 ***  -23.656 ***  -3.893 ***  -18.709 *** 
 
 -4.839   -5.022   -3.034   -4.897  
Image (+) 5.109 **   4.650 **   0.459     4.010 ** 
 
 1.795     2.021     0.717     2.172   
Technology (+) -0.663     0.369     -1.031    1.660   
 
 -0.228     0.154     -1.523     0.843   
Recycled (-/0) -3.745   -2.105   -1.640   -0.552  
 
 -0.957   -0.705   -1.271   -0.239  
Recycled*Image (-) -10.074 **   -7.907 **   -2.168 *   -7.286 ** 
 
 -1.855     -1.836     -1.562     -1.905   
Recycled*Technology (+) 28.058 ***   20.988 ***   7.070 ***   16.461 *** 
 
 3.297     2.965     3.995     2.567   
LitgRisk (+) 0.014   0.011   0.003   0.004  
 
 0.444   0.461   0.302   0.200  
CapDema (+) 1.724 ***  1.331 ***  0.394 ***  0.888 *** 
 
 4.052   3.958   3.555   3.239  
Leverage ? -6.793   -4.954   -1.838   -2.264  
 
 -0.896   -0.860   -0.892   -0.523  
Size (+) 4.360 ***  3.454 ***  0.906 ***  2.512 *** 
 
 5.127   5.011   4.565   4.561  
OthDisc (+) 0.192 ***  0.162 ***  0.030 ***  0.108 *** 
  4.454   4.425   3.094   3.459  
             
Adj. R2  0.683   0.693   0.509   0.637  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
           
             
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.111 ***  -25.240 ***  -4.871 ***  -19.969 *** 
 
 -5.511   -5.598   -3.955   -5.461  
Image (+) 6.778 **   5.842 **   0.936 *   4.915 *** 
 
 2.231     2.365     1.398     2.469   
Technology (+) 3.161     3.115 *   0.046     3.780 ** 
 
 1.131     1.389     0.070     2.024   
Disposed (+/0) 4.066   1.740   2.326 *  2.465  
 
 1.046   0.552   1.524   0.961  
Disposed*Image (+) -18.089 ***   -12.619 **   -5.470 ***   -10.796 ** 
 
 -2.418     -2.074     -2.640     -2.037   
Disposed*Technology (-) 2.445     1.402     1.043     1.008   
 
 0.356     0.258     0.604     0.212   
LitgRisk (+) 0.006   0.006   0.000   0.005  
 
 0.217   0.287   0.000   0.324  
CapDema (+) 1.537 ***  1.179 ***  0.357 ***  0.777 *** 
 
 3.940   3.848   3.249   3.191  
Leverage ? 3.373   2.478   0.895   3.453  
 
 0.539   0.521   0.514   0.943  
Size (+) 3.916 ***  3.134 ***  0.783 ***  2.273 *** 
 
 4.550   4.535   3.887   4.190  
OthDisc (+) 0.220 ***  0.180 ***  0.040 ***  0.122 *** 
  5.418   5.268   4.285   4.164  
             
Adj. R2  0.677   0.690   0.499   0.633  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
A company’s competitive strategy is determined by the following procedure: 
• Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales prior to the year of VED; 
• Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of VED; 
Image:  equals 1 if the advertising ratio is in the top one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Technology:  equals 1 if the R&D ratio is in the top one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Determining Image and 
Technology Using the Median of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
 
 
 
        
Panel A: Recycled 
 
 
        
  
  
 
        
  Total  
 
Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.  
 
Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.855 ***  -25.992 ***  -4.862 ***  -20.120 *** 
 
 -5.779   -5.849   -4.129   -5.620  
Image (+) 6.621 ***   5.478 ***   1.142 **   4.985 *** 
 
 3.078     3.181     2.057     3.519   
Technology (+) 1.639     1.952     -0.313     1.913 *  
 
 0.687     1.036     -0.503     1.291   
LitgRisk (+) -0.005   -0.004   -0.001   -0.008  
 
 -0.194   -0.221   -0.075   -0.486  
CapDema (+) 1.615 ***  1.245 ***  0.370 ***  0.829 *** 
 
 3.989   3.948   3.272   3.304  
Leverage ? -4.012   -3.132   -0.881   -1.872  
 
 -0.595   -0.634   -0.454   -0.551  
Size (+) 4.093 ***  3.237 ***  0.856 ***  2.334 *** 
 
 5.000   4.849   4.491   4.509  
OthDisc (+) 0.225 ***  0.187 ***  0.038 ***  0.129 *** 
  5.712   5.532   3.837   4.356  
Recycled (-/0) 0.964   1.245   -0.281   1.501  
 
 0.302   0.502   -0.323   0.756  
             
Adj. R2  0.686   0.696   0.502   0.638  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.924 ***  -25.109 ***  -4.816 ***  -19.534 *** 
 
 -5.784   -5.860   -3.962   -5.547  
Image (+) 6.447 ***   5.298 ***   1.149 **   4.832 *** 
 
 2.979     3.060     2.079     3.421   
Technology (+) 1.810     2.106     -0.297     1.999 * 
 
 0.769     1.136     -0.484     1.372   
LitgRisk (+) -0.008   -0.006   -0.002   -0.007  
 
 -0.381   -0.358   -0.293   -0.434  
CapDema (+) 1.574 ***  1.206 ***  0.367 ***  0.806 *** 
 
 4.073   4.075   3.101   3.354  
Leverage ? -3.094   -2.307   -0.788   -1.423  
 
 -0.518   -0.538   -0.416   -0.474  
Size (+) 4.065 ***  3.223 ***  0.842 ***  2.350 *** 
 
 5.038   4.926   4.378   4.594  
OthDisc (+) 0.218 ***  0.180 ***  0.038 ***  0.123 *** 
  5.435   5.222   4.046   4.062  
Disposed (+/0) -4.255   -4.005 **  -0.250   -2.579  
 
 -1.283   -1.737   -0.207   -1.430  
             
Adj. R2  0.691   0.702   0.502   0.641  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
A company’s competitive strategy is determined by the following procedure: 
• Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales prior to the year of VED; 
• Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of VED; 
Image:  equals 1 if the advertising ratio is above the industry median and 0 otherwise; 
Technology:  equals 1 if the R&D ratio is above the industry median and 0 otherwise; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance Behavior – 
Determining Image and Technology Using the Median of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
Panel A: Recycled 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.602 ***  -26.053 ***  -4.549 ***  -20.290 *** 
 
 -5.417   -5.528   -3.574   -5.319  
Image (+) 7.769 ***   6.381 ***   1.388 **   5.666 *** 
 
 3.193    3.231    2.292    3.490  
Technology (+) 0.093    0.969    -0.876    1.281  
 
 0.034    0.436    -1.281    0.728  
Recycled (-/0) 0.229   1.258   -1.029   1.793  
 
 0.053   0.367   -0.736   0.656  
Recycled*Image (-) -9.680 *   -7.362 *   -2.318 *   -5.447 * 
 
 -1.472    -1.429    -1.352    -1.293  
Recycled*Technology (+) 11.173 *   7.320 *   3.853 **   4.836  
 
 1.613    1.334    2.186    1.076  
LitgRisk (+) -0.002   -0.004   0.002   -0.009  
 
 -0.095   -0.217   0.195   -0.539  
CapDema (+) 1.622 ***  1.247 ***  0.374 ***  0.829 *** 
 
 3.935   3.869   3.377   3.238  
Leverage ? -5.489   -4.032   -1.457   -2.429  
 
 -0.781   -0.772   -0.736   -0.664  
Size (+) 4.162 ***  3.296 ***  0.866 ***  2.381 *** 
 
 5.149   4.987   4.666   4.629  
OthDisc (+) 0.222 ***  0.185 ***  0.037 ***  0.128 *** 
  5.626   5.488   3.689   4.326  
             
Adj. R2  0.686   0.693   0.510   0.633  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
  Total  
 
Hard  
 
Soft  
 
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -31.032 ***  -25.825 ***  -5.207 ***  -20.080 *** 
 
 -6.262   -6.151   -4.874   -5.759  
Image (+) 8.613 ***   6.702 ***   1.911 ***   5.991 *** 
 
 3.594    3.492    3.183    3.912  
Technology (+) 1.083    1.643    -0.560    1.807  
 
 0.414    0.792    -0.882    1.114  
Disposed (+/0) 2.431   0.369   2.062 *  2.032  
 
 0.631   0.114   1.629   0.732  
Disposed*Image (+) -17.218 ***   -11.172 ***   -6.047 ***   -9.497 *** 
 
 -3.654    -2.982    -3.485    -2.910  
Disposed*Technology (-) 6.577    4.202    2.375    1.923  
 
 1.380    1.137    1.430    0.651  
LitgRisk (+) -0.008   -0.006   -0.002   -0.005  
 
 -0.375   -0.342   -0.315   -0.307  
CapDema (+) 1.657 ***  1.260 ***  0.398 ***  0.816 *** 
 
 4.918   4.561   4.164   3.566  
Leverage ? -0.295   -0.493   0.198   0.052  
 
 -0.057   -0.126   0.136   0.019  
Size (+) 3.925 ***  3.131 ***  0.794 ***  2.246 *** 
 
 4.892   4.767   4.417   4.382  
OthDisc (+) 0.233 ***  0.190 ***  0.043 ***  0.131 *** 
  5.920   5.476   5.235   4.283  
             
Adj. R2  0.707   0.708   0.561   0.649  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
A company’s competitive strategy is determined by the following procedure: 
• Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales prior to the year of VED; 
• Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of VED; 
Image:  equals 1 if the advertising ratio is above the industry median and 0 otherwise; 
Technology:  equals 1 if the R&D ratio is above the industry median and 0 otherwise; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Letting Image and Technology 
Equal the Advertising Ratio and the R&D Ratio, Respectively 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.440 ***  -24.058 ***  -4.382 ***  -18.544 *** 
 
 -4.901   -5.103   -3.369   -4.992  
Image (+) 59.261 ***   50.727 ***   8.534 *   43.489 *** 
 
 2.411     2.663     1.415     3.016   
Technology (+) 8.342     13.607     -5.264    17.617 * 
 
 0.464     0.922     -1.372     1.526   
LitgRisk (+) 0.002   0.003   -0.001   0.000  
 
 0.061   0.137   -0.148   0.002  
CapDema (+) 1.330 ***  0.993 ***  0.336 ***  0.600 ** 
 
 2.980   2.866   2.875   2.190  
Leverage ? -4.267   -3.040   -1.228   -1.159  
 
 -0.568   -0.542   -0.594   -0.282  
Size (+) 3.910 ***  3.038 ***  0.872 ***  2.124 *** 
 
 4.690   4.491   4.423   4.006  
OthDisc (+) 0.233 ***  0.196 ***  0.037 ***  0.137 *** 
  5.547   5.447   3.992   4.333  
Recycled (-/0) 1.430   1.771   -0.341   2.014  
 
 0.462   0.749   -0.374   1.046  
             
Adj. R2  0.664   0.676   0.494   0.612  
N  74   74   74   74  
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.105 ***  -22.860 ***  -4.245 ***  -17.740 *** 
 
 -4.761   -4.958   -3.197   -4.821  
Image (+) 61.473 ***   52.166 ***   9.308 **   43.530 *** 
 
 2.846     3.120     1.677     3.337   
Technology (+) 5.775     11.187     -5.412    15.799 * 
 
 0.315     0.740     -1.443     1.332   
LitgRisk (+) -0.002   0.001   -0.003   0.001  
 
 -0.102   0.053   -0.462   0.095  
CapDema (+) 1.278 ***  0.951 ***  0.328 ***  0.576 ** 
 
 2.978   2.909   2.701   2.229  
Leverage ? -3.767   -2.657   -1.110   -1.014  
 
 -0.569   -0.555   -0.556   -0.288  
Size (+) 3.895 ***  3.045 ***  0.851 ***  2.161 *** 
 
 4.691   4.542   4.274   4.111  
OthDisc (+) 0.224 ***  0.187 ***  0.037 ***  0.129 *** 
  5.320   5.181   4.075   4.060  
Disposed (+/0) -5.380   -4.761 **  -0.619   -3.081 ** 
 
 -1.628   -2.011   -0.545   -1.685  
             
Adj. R2  0.672   0.684   0.496   0.616  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Competitive strategy measures: 
Image:  Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising 
expenditure to sales prior to the year of VED; 
Technology:  Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of 
VED; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 8 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance 
– Letting Image and Technology Equal the Advertising Ratio and the R&D Ratio, Respectively 
Panel A: Recycled 
            
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -26.983 ***  -23.009 ***  -3.974 ***  -17.821 *** 
 
 -4.728   -4.922   -3.190   -4.813  
Image (+) 58.982 ***   50.972 ***   8.010 *   44.318 *** 
 
 2.750     3.036     1.491     3.371   
Technology (+) -8.980     1.251     -10.231 ***   9.265   
 
 -0.478     0.078     -2.888     0.729   
Recycled (-/0) -6.420 *  -3.982   -2.438 *  -2.105  
 
 -1.393   -1.171   -1.573   -0.807  
Recycled*Image (-) 38.887     45.219     -6.332     56.715   
 
 0.193     0.300     -0.108     0.457   
Recycled*Technology (+) 111.256 **   76.559 *   34.697 ***   47.566   
 
 1.732     1.463     2.458     1.060   
LitgRisk (+) 0.018   0.015   0.003   0.009  
 
 0.556   0.623   0.265   0.449  
CapDema (+) 1.575 ***  1.170 ***  0.405 ***  0.721 *** 
 
 4.005   3.761   3.990   2.892  
Leverage ? -8.975   -6.392   -2.583   -3.416  
 
 -1.177   -1.109   -1.246   -0.812  
Size (+) 4.241 ***  3.275 ***  0.967 ***  2.283 *** 
 
 4.833   4.571   4.877   4.070  
OthDisc (+) 0.213 ***  0.181 ***  0.032 ***  0.127 *** 
  4.858   4.779   3.447   3.840  
             
Adj. R2  0.675   0.683   0.520   0.614  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -34.139 ***  -27.845 ***  -6.294 ***  -21.568 *** 
 
 -5.836   -5.662   -5.133   -5.353  
Image (+) 123.882 ***   96.732 ***   27.150 ***   77.759 *** 
 
 3.778     3.541     4.155     3.452   
Technology (+) 10.088     13.807     -3.719     17.810 * 
 
 0.569     0.938     -1.042     1.524   
Disposed (+/0) 6.007 *  2.710   3.297 **  2.655  
 
 1.578   0.877   2.225   1.168  
Disposed*Image (+) -260.219 ***   -184.097 ***   -76.122 ***   -141.388 *** 
 
 -3.520     -2.959     -4.430     -2.781   
Disposed*Technology (-) -0.795     8.585     -9.380     6.628   
 
 -0.020     0.284     -0.856     0.257   
LitgRisk (+) 0.003   0.004   -0.001   0.004  
 
 0.106   0.201   -0.145   0.228  
CapDema (+) 1.801 ***  1.337 ***  0.464 ***  0.873 *** 
 
 5.129   4.725   4.774   3.734  
Leverage ? 6.567   4.633   1.934   4.585  
 
 1.017   0.907   1.145   1.171  
Size (+) 4.207 ***  3.279 ***  0.928 ***  2.341 *** 
 
 5.049   4.807   5.003   4.309  
OthDisc (+) 0.230 ***  0.190 ***  0.039 ***  0.132 *** 
  5.953   5.645   4.802   4.415  
             
Adj. R2  0.704   0.707   0.566   0.638  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Competitive strategy measures: 
Image:  Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising 
expenditure to sales prior to the year of VED; 
Technology:  Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of 
VED; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 9 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – All Variables Ranked 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
          
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -12.380   -15.441 **  -4.735   -13.937 ** 
 
 -1.459   -2.030   -0.496   -2.314  
Image (+) 0.102   0.109 *  0.105   0.143 ** 
 
 1.162   1.322   1.067   2.012   
Technology (+) 0.033   0.054   -0.043   0.081   
 
 0.314   0.531   -0.398   0.933   
LitgRisk (+) 0.162 *  0.191 **  0.086   0.095 * 
 
 1.519   1.971   0.680   1.358  
CapDema (+) 0.226 ***  0.246 ***  0.220 ***  0.211 *** 
 
 2.861   3.449   2.596   3.365  
Leverage ? 0.019   0.004   0.013   0.030  
 
 0.223   0.049   0.146   0.419  
Size (+) 0.641 ***  0.603 ***  0.619 ***  0.528 *** 
 
 5.515   5.623   5.085   5.828  
OthDisc (+) 0.152   0.173 *  0.118   0.227 *** 
  1.174   1.442   0.839   2.489  
Recycled (-/0) -0.004   0.030   0.007   0.056  
 
 -0.039   0.333   0.064   0.850  
             
Adj. R2  0.531   0.553   0.422   0.607  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
  
           
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3  
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -18.771 *  -18.541 *  -11.017   -16.613 ** 
 
 -1.851   -1.972   -0.996   -2.240  
Image (+) 0.118   0.116 *  0.121   0.147 ** 
 
 1.284   1.329   1.200   2.033   
Technology (+) 0.060   0.068   -0.016   0.094   
 
 0.572   0.667   -0.146   1.114   
LitgRisk (+) 0.191   0.220 **  0.120   0.134 ** 
 
 1.970   2.452   1.096   1.867  
CapDema (+) 0.236 ***  0.254 ***  0.231 ***  0.221 *** 
 
 3.000   3.541   2.675   3.377  
Leverage ? 0.010   -0.001   0.004   0.025  
 
 0.112   -0.011   0.047   0.345  
Size (+) 0.658 ***  0.627 ***  0.641 ***  0.563 *** 
 
 6.503   6.420   5.976   7.351  
OthDisc (+) 0.140   0.157 *  0.102   0.204 *** 
  1.165   1.372   0.776   2.440  
Disposed (+/0) 0.089   0.053   0.090   0.055  
 
 1.141   0.711   1.086   0.809  
             
Adj. R2  0.539   0.555   0.430   0.608  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Competitive strategy measures: 
Image:  Rank of Advertising within the industry; Advertising is defined in Table 1; 
Technology:  Rank of R&D within the industry; R&D is defined in Table 1; 
Other variables are ranks of corresponding variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 10 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and 
Environmental Performance – All Variables  Ranked 
Panel A: Recycled 
            
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -0.106   -6.310   9.515   -4.137  
 
 -0.008   -0.567   0.685   -0.534  
Image (+) 0.202     0.212     0.161     0.161   
 
 1.091     1.219     0.823     1.119   
Technology (+) -0.312 **   -0.230     -0.383 **   -0.133   
 
 -1.712     -1.286     -2.027     -0.913   
Recycled (-/0) -0.260   -0.163   -0.287   -0.144 * 
 
 -1.089   -0.759   -1.110   -1.355  
Recycled*Image (-) -0.003     -0.003     -0.002     -0.001   
 
 -0.622     -0.660     -0.346     -0.194   
Recycled*Technology (+) 0.010 **   0.008 **   0.010 **   0.006 ** 
 
 2.280     1.969     2.022     1.835   
LitgRisk (+) 0.194 **  0.219 **  0.116   0.113 * 
 
 1.858   2.286   0.948   1.665  
CapDema (+) 0.229 ***  0.248 ***  0.225 ***  0.215 *** 
 
 3.011   3.533   2.767   3.498  
Leverage ? -0.019   -0.025   -0.029   0.001  
 
 -0.247   -0.315   -0.324   0.013  
Size (+) 0.638 ***  0.604 ***  0.609 ***  0.519 *** 
 
 5.875   5.901   5.384   5.793  
OthDisc (+) 0.096   0.125   0.066   0.196 ** 
  0.849   1.146   0.530   2.278  
             
Adj. R2  0.556   0.567   0.443   0.614  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
 78
TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
             
  Total   Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -22.358 *  -21.029 *  -15.468   -18.261 ** 
 
 -1.796   -1.806   -1.163   -2.029  
Image (+) 0.214 *   0.203 *   0.285 **   0.122   
 
 1.346     1.315     1.689     0.900   
Technology (+) 0.049     0.044     -0.067     0.147   
 
 0.248     0.238     -0.328     0.883   
Disposed (+/0) 0.183   0.122   0.215   0.087  
 
 1.007   0.717   1.107   0.661  
Disposed*Image (+) -0.003     -0.002     -0.004     0.001   
 
 -0.734     -0.705     -1.138     0.251   
Disposed*Technology (-) 0.000     0.001     0.001     -0.001   
 
 0.059     0.160     0.311     -0.391   
LitgRisk (+) 0.187 **  0.213 **  0.105   0.147 ** 
 
 1.928   2.380   0.938   1.938  
CapDema (+) 0.238 ***  0.258 ***  0.239 ***  0.214 *** 
 
 3.042   3.561   2.787   3.169  
Leverage ? 0.011   -0.001   0.003   0.030  
 
 0.124   -0.015   0.034   0.411  
Size (+) 0.658 ***  0.627 ***  0.641 ***  0.563 *** 
 
 6.487   6.436   5.968   7.327  
OthDisc (+) 0.142   0.160 *  0.109   0.200 ** 
  1.176   1.395   0.837   2.310  
             
Adj. R2  0.528   0.544   0.423   0.596  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Competitive strategy measures: 
Image:  Rank of Advertising within the industry; Advertising is defined in Table 1; 
Technology:  Rank of R&D within the industry; R&D is defined in Table 1; 
Other variables are ranks of corresponding variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 11 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Considering the Tension 
between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
          
  
           
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
 
            
Intercept ? -27.942 ***  -23.098 ***  -4.843 ***  -17.581 *** 
 
 -4.691   -4.674   -3.850   -4.414  
Image (+) 2.603   1.658   0.944 *  1.544  
 
 1.026   0.810   1.475   0.946  
Technology (+) 4.234 *  4.124 **  0.110   4.606 *** 
 
 1.626   1.928   0.168   2.599  
LitgRisk (+) -0.013   -0.012   -0.001   -0.014  
 
 -0.461   -0.562   -0.098   -0.782  
CapDema (+) 1.400 ***  1.042 ***  0.358 ***  0.631 *** 
 
 3.349   3.197   3.144   2.433  
Leverage ? -2.606   -1.577   -1.030   0.048  
 
 -0.390   -0.317   -0.535   0.014  
Size (+) 3.873 ***  3.002 ***  0.871 ***  2.078 *** 
 
 4.128   3.932   4.121   3.470  
OthDisc (+) 0.226 ***  0.189 ***  0.037 ***  0.131 *** 
  5.110   5.015   3.735   4.052  
Recycled (-/0) 0.822   1.164   -0.342   1.595  
 
 0.267   0.482   -0.397   0.815  
             
Adj. R2  0.645   0.653   0.488   0.586  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 11 (Continued) 
 
 
          
Panel B: Disposed 
          
             
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
  
           
Intercept ? -26.858 ***  -22.081 ***  -4.777 ***  -16.892 *** 
 
 -4.610   -4.583   -3.766   -4.338  
Image (+) 2.472   1.501   0.970 *  1.368  
 
 0.984   0.751   1.502   0.866  
Technology (+) 4.076 *  3.926 **  0.150   4.370 *** 
 
 1.581   1.866   0.232   2.525  
LitgRisk (+) -0.018   -0.015   -0.003   -0.013  
 
 -0.721   -0.781   -0.357   -0.784  
CapDema (+) 1.359 ***  1.006 ***  0.353 ***  0.611 *** 
 
 3.382   3.261   3.004   2.469  
Leverage ? -1.841   -0.923   -0.918   0.355  
 
 -0.305   -0.209   -0.486   0.112  
Size (+) 3.839 ***  2.987 ***  0.853 ***  2.101 *** 
 
 4.174   4.004   4.051   3.595  
OthDisc (+) 0.220 ***  0.183 ***  0.037 ***  0.125 *** 
  4.998   4.845   3.898   3.848  
Disposed (+/0) -4.399   -4.064 **  -0.334   -2.613  
 
 -1.483   -1.952   -0.305   -1.619  
             
Adj. R2  0.650   0.659   0.488   0.589  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 11 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
A company’s competitive strategy is determined by the following procedure: 
• Using the advertising expenditure provided by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc. calculate the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales prior to the year of VED; 
• Calculate the average of the yearly ratio of R&D expenditure to sales over the three years preceding the year of VED; 
• Subtract the advertising-sales ratio from the R&D-sales ratio; 
• Sort the differences in a descending order; 
Image:  equals 1 if the difference is in the lower one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Technology: equals 1 if the difference is in the upper one third of the industry and 0 otherwise; 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 12 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance – 
Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
             
Panel A: Recycled             
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -26.651 ***  -22.094 ***  -4.558 ***  -16.687 *** 
 
 -4.760   -4.703   -3.876   -4.329  
Image (+) 1.355   0.839   0.516   1.231  
 
 0.445   0.340   0.692   0.646  
Technology (+) -0.019   1.020   -1.039   2.412  
 
 -0.006   0.393   -1.365   1.106  
Recycled (-/0) -9.139 **  -5.985 *  -3.154 ***  -3.108  
 
 -1.970   -1.635   -2.567   -1.168  
Recycled*Image (-) 6.060   3.950   2.109   1.414  
 
 0.991   0.827   1.087   0.396  
Recycled*Technology (+) 27.946 ***  20.546 ***  7.400 ***  14.964 ** 
 
 3.038   2.637   4.049   2.175  
LitgRisk (+) 0.019   0.011   0.008   0.001  
 
 0.658   0.478   1.012   0.078  
CapDema (+) 1.671 ***  1.244 ***  0.427 ***  0.785 *** 
 
 4.384   4.061   4.256   3.091  
Leverage ? -7.965   -5.571   -2.394   -3.020  
 
 -1.205   -1.086   -1.330   -0.797  
Size (+) 4.406 ***  3.382 ***  1.024 ***  2.319 *** 
 
 4.682   4.398   4.772   3.807  
OthDisc (+) 0.194 ***  0.166 ***  0.028 ***  0.115 *** 
  4.001   3.998   2.729   3.312  
             
Adj. R2  0.671   0.673   0.533   0.603  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 12 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
            
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -30.302 ***  -24.467 ***  -5.836 ***  -18.544 *** 
 
 -5.256   -5.082   -4.700   -4.677  
Image (+) 4.835 **  3.135 *  1.700 **  2.486 * 
 
 1.710   1.411   2.284   1.418  
Technology (+) 6.102 **  5.361 **  0.741   5.475 *** 
 
 2.114   2.247   1.097   2.812  
Disposed (+/0) 9.425 **  5.603 **  3.822 *  4.399 ** 
 
 2.027   1.678   1.616   1.674  
Disposed*Image (+) -18.946 ***  -13.121 ***  -5.826 **  -9.068 *** 
 
 -3.230   -3.192   -2.052   -2.695  
Disposed*Technology (-) -16.228 ***  -11.523 **  -4.705 **  -8.964 *** 
 
 -2.821   -2.609   -1.968   -2.387  
LitgRisk (+) -0.012   -0.011   -0.001   -0.009  
 
 -0.475   -0.540   -0.155   -0.528  
CapDema (+) 1.488 ***  1.091 ***  0.397 ***  0.653 *** 
 
 3.974   3.667   3.816   2.676  
Leverage ? -0.252   0.189   -0.441   1.166  
 
 -0.044   0.044   -0.256   0.366  
Size (+) 3.997 ***  3.092 ***  0.905 ***  2.160 *** 
 
 4.478   4.252   4.450   3.756  
OthDisc (+) 0.225 ***  0.186 ***  0.039 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.308   5.097   4.173   4.044  
             
Adj. R2  0.657   0.662   0.511   0.588  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
 85
TABLE 12 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 13 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Considering the Tension 
between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company (Tobit Model) 
 
            
Panel A: Recycled 
          
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard  
 
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -27.942 ***  -23.098 ***  -4.843 ***  -17.581 *** 
 
 -4.741   -4.853   -3.322   -4.491  
Image (+) 2.603   1.658   0.944 *  1.544  
 
 0.978   0.772   1.434   0.874  
Technology (+) 4.234 *  4.124 **  0.110   4.606 *** 
 
 1.534   1.850   0.161   2.512  
LitgRisk (+) -0.013   -0.012   -0.001   -0.014  
 
 -0.278   -0.322   -0.074   -0.452  
CapDema (+) 1.400 ***  1.042 ***  0.358 ***  0.631 ** 
 
 3.093   2.852   3.193   2.101  
Leverage ? -2.606   -1.577   -1.030   0.048  
 
 -0.455   -0.341   -0.726   0.013  
Size (+) 3.873 ***  3.002 ***  0.871 ***  2.078 *** 
 
 4.291   4.118   3.901   3.466  
OthDisc (+) 0.226 ***  0.189 ***  0.037 ***  0.131 *** 
  5.231   5.422   3.447   4.553  
Recycled (-/0) 0.822   1.164   -0.342   1.595  
 
 0.217   0.381   -0.365   0.635  
             
Log Likelihood -267.155   -251.340   -163.786   -236.876  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 13 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -26.858 ***  -22.081 ***  -4.777 ***  -16.892 *** 
 
 -4.536   -4.626   -3.235   -4.277  
Image (+) 2.472   1.501   0.970 *  1.368  
 
 0.943   0.711   1.485   0.783  
Technology (+) 4.076 *  3.926 **  0.150   4.370 *** 
 
 1.512   1.807   0.223   2.430  
LitgRisk (+) -0.018   -0.015   -0.003   -0.013  
 
 -0.401   -0.424   -0.238   -0.437  
CapDema (+) 1.359 ***  1.006 ***  0.353 ***  0.611 ** 
 
 3.015   2.770   3.140   2.035  
Leverage ? -1.841   -0.923   -0.918   0.355  
 
 -0.322   -0.200   -0.643   0.093  
Size (+) 3.839 ***  2.987 ***  0.853 ***  2.101 *** 
 
 4.337   4.186   3.862   3.559  
OthDisc (+) 0.220 ***  0.183 ***  0.037 ***  0.125 *** 
  5.199   5.357   3.533   4.417  
Disposed (+/0) -4.399   -4.064   -0.334   -2.613  
 
 -1.108   -1.270   -0.338   -0.987  
             
Log Likelihood -266.569   -250.614   -163.796   -236.593  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 13 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
Chi-squared statistics are under the coefficient estimates; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 14 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance – 
Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company (Tobit Model) 
 
            
Panel A: Recycled 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -26.651 ***  -22.094 ***  -4.558 ***  -16.687 *** 
 
 -4.713   -4.794   -3.281   -4.368  
Image (+) 1.355   0.839   0.516   1.231  
 
 0.451   0.342   0.699   0.606  
Technology (+) -0.019   1.020   -1.039   2.412  
 
 -0.006   0.410   -1.385   1.169  
Recycled (-/0) -9.139 *  -5.985   -3.154 **  -3.108  
 
 -1.539   -1.236   -2.161   -0.774  
Recycled*Image (-) 6.060   3.950   2.109   1.414  
 
 0.721   0.576   1.021   0.249  
Recycled*Technology (+) 27.946 ***  20.546 ***  7.400 ***  14.964 ** 
 
 2.872   2.591   3.096   2.276  
LitgRisk (+) 0.019   0.011   0.008   0.001  
 
 0.417   0.295   0.719   0.049  
CapDema (+) 1.671 ***  1.244 ***  0.427 ***  0.785 *** 
 
 3.806   3.476   3.959   2.647  
Leverage ? -7.965   -5.571   -2.394 *  -3.020  
 
 -1.384   -1.187   -1.693   -0.777  
Size (+) 4.406 ***  3.382 ***  1.024 ***  2.319 *** 
 
 4.886   4.601   4.624   3.806  
OthDisc (+) 0.194 ***  0.166 ***  0.028 ***  0.115 *** 
  4.479   4.705   2.622   3.935  
             
Log Likelihood  -263.131   -247.997   -159.247   -234.108  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
            
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -30.302 ***  -24.467 ***  -5.836 ***  -18.544 *** 
 
 -5.009   -4.985   -3.918   -4.546  
Image (+) 4.835 **  3.135 *  1.700 ***  2.486 * 
 
 1.693   1.353   2.417   1.291  
Technology (+) 6.102 **  5.361 **  0.741   5.475 *** 
 
 2.108   2.283   1.040   2.805  
Disposed (+/0) 9.425   5.603   3.822 **  4.399  
 
 1.178   0.863   1.940   0.815  
Disposed*Image (+) -18.946 **  -13.121   -5.826 ***  -9.068  
 
 -1.890   -1.613   -2.360   -1.341  
Disposed*Technology (-) -16.228 *  -11.523 *  -4.705 **  -8.964 * 
 
 -1.592   -1.393   -1.874   -1.304  
LitgRisk (+) -0.012   -0.011   -0.001   -0.009  
 
 -0.269   -0.302   -0.100   -0.301  
CapDema (+) 1.488 ***  1.091 ***  0.397 ***  0.653 ** 
 
 3.143   2.840   3.408   2.047  
Leverage ? -0.252   0.189   -0.441   1.166  
 
 -0.045   0.041   -0.318   0.307  
Size (+) 3.997 ***  3.092 ***  0.905 ***  2.160 *** 
 
 4.550   4.338   4.183   3.646  
OthDisc (+) 0.225 ***  0.186 ***  0.039 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.425   5.538   3.784   4.560  
             
Log Likelihood  -264.655   -249.188   -160.940   -235.505  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 14 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
Chi-squared statistics are under the coefficient estimates; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 15 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Considering the Tension 
between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company and with Website 
Disclosure Scores Set to Zero 
 
          
Panel A: Recycled 
          
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -27.123 ***  -22.161 ***  -4.962 ***  -16.589 *** 
 
 -4.126   -4.172   -3.646   -4.065  
Image (+) 0.040   0.014   0.026   0.701  
 
 0.014   0.006   0.037   0.428  
Technology (+) 5.287 **  4.655 **  0.632   4.593 *** 
 
 1.829   1.989   0.974   2.450  
LitgRisk (+) -0.021   -0.017   -0.004   -0.011  
 
 -0.686   -0.707   -0.576   -0.577  
CapDema (+) 0.902 **  0.746 **  0.155 *  0.497 ** 
 
 2.160   2.271   1.619   1.934  
Leverage ? 4.464   3.085   1.379   2.746  
 
 0.681   0.630   0.793   0.794  
Size (+) 2.972 ***  2.412 ***  0.560 ***  1.689 *** 
 
 3.023   3.098   2.554   2.912  
OthDisc (+) 0.254 ***  0.205 ***  0.049 ***  0.143 *** 
  5.244   5.107   4.619   4.373  
Recycled (-/0) 1.954   1.768   0.186   2.048  
 
 0.588   0.686   0.238   1.030  
             
Adj. R2  0.595   0.610   0.470   0.570  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 15 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
          
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -25.497 ***  -20.966 ***  -4.531 ***  -15.813 *** 
 
 -4.019   -4.075   -3.484   -3.997  
Image (+) -0.219   -0.205   -0.014   0.481  
 
 -0.078   -0.094   -0.020   0.309  
Technology (+) 4.959 **  4.372 **  0.587   4.296 *** 
 
 1.788   1.944   0.943   2.382  
LitgRisk (+) -0.026   -0.019   -0.007   -0.009  
 
 -0.943   -0.882   -1.073   -0.514  
CapDema (+) 0.844 **  0.706 **  0.138 *  0.475 ** 
 
 2.174   2.302   1.542   1.977  
Leverage ? 5.492   3.785   1.707   3.050  
 
 0.965   0.890   1.109   1.016  
Size (+) 2.952 ***  2.411 ***  0.541 ***  1.726 *** 
 
 3.090   3.160   2.598   3.038  
OthDisc (+) 0.243 ***  0.196 ***  0.047 ***  0.136 *** 
  4.997   4.829   4.492   4.063  
Disposed (+/0) -6.479 ***  -4.705 **  -1.774 ***  -2.901 ** 
 
 -2.465   -2.338   -2.659   -1.810  
             
Adj. R2  0.606   0.619   0.490   0.573  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 15 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 16 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance – Considering the 
Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company and with Website Disclosure Scores Set to Zero 
 
            
Panel A: Recycled 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -26.423 ***  -21.638 ***  -4.785 ***  -16.092 *** 
 
 -4.146   -4.182   -3.671   -4.013  
Image (+) -0.872   -0.719   -0.154   0.313  
 
 -0.241   -0.258   -0.173   0.158  
Technology (+) 2.655   2.620   0.035   3.081 * 
 
 0.763   0.918   0.046   1.347  
Recycled (-/0) -4.396   -3.178   -1.218   -1.421  
 
 -0.840   -0.784   -0.950   -0.508  
Recycled*Image (-) 4.481   3.605   0.876   1.867  
 
 0.651   0.676   0.534   0.516  
Recycled*Technology (+) 17.058 *  13.148 *  3.911 *  10.030 * 
 
 1.516   1.448   1.667   1.359  
LitgRisk (+) -0.001   -0.001   0.000   0.001  
 
 -0.035   -0.048   0.010   0.031  
CapDema (+) 1.064 ***  0.870 ***  0.193 ***  0.595 *** 
 
 2.576   2.703   1.975   2.371  
Leverage ? 1.278   0.645   0.632   0.789  
 
 0.181   0.120   0.347   0.207  
Size (+) 3.317 ***  2.681 ***  0.636 ***  1.873 *** 
 
 3.209   3.290   2.716   3.092  
OthDisc (+) 0.234 ***  0.189 ***  0.045 ***  0.132 *** 
  4.453   4.340   3.992   3.755  
             
Adj. R2  0.595   0.610   0.469   0.570  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 16 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
           
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard 
  
Soft 
  
A3 
 
Variable  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -28.418 ***  -23.298 ***  -5.120 ***  -17.761 *** 
 
 -4.382   -4.443   -3.756   -4.367  
Image (+) 1.813   1.406   0.407   1.824  
 
 0.552   0.562   0.483   1.022  
Technology (+) 6.434 **  5.650 **  0.785   5.388 *** 
 
 2.047   2.214   1.111   2.664  
Disposed (+/0) 4.552   4.386 *  0.166   4.766 ** 
 
 1.113   1.337   0.181   1.920  
Disposed*Image (+) -16.104 ***  -12.844 ***  -3.260 **  -10.726 *** 
 
 -2.648   -2.782   -2.028   -3.064  
Disposed*Technology (-) -11.615 **  -10.153 **  -1.462 *  -8.705 ** 
 
 -2.155   -2.292   -1.301   -2.346  
LitgRisk (+) -0.023   -0.016   -0.007   -0.006  
 
 -0.798   -0.701   -1.070   -0.332  
CapDema (+) 0.990 ***  0.808 ***  0.182 **  0.557 ** 
 
 2.504   2.598   1.996   2.337  
Leverage ? 6.750   4.826   1.924   3.930  
 
 1.222   1.164   1.284   1.343  
Size (+) 3.116 ***  2.529 ***  0.587 ***  1.821 *** 
 
 3.282   3.355   2.779   3.247  
OthDisc (+) 0.246 ***  0.199 ***  0.047 ***  0.138 *** 
  5.184   5.030   4.558   4.267  
             
Adj. R2  0.605   0.618   0.485   0.575  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 16 (Continued) 
 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 17 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Considering the 
Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company (Logit 
Model) 
         
Dependent Variable: Total 
    
 
  
  
Panel A: Recycled  
 
Panel B: Disposed 
 
Variable  Coef.  
 
Variable  Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -7.030 ***  Intercept ? -6.568 *** 
 
 10.640     10.458  
Image (+) 0.540   Image (+) 0.682  
 
 0.453     0.826  
Technology (+) -0.931   Technology (+) -0.201  
 
 1.043     0.061  
LitgRisk (+) 0.022 *  LitgRisk (+) 0.013  
 
 2.213     0.850  
CapDema (+) 0.354 ***  CapDema (+) 0.297 ** 
 
 5.730     4.676  
Leverage ? -2.076   Leverage ? -0.958  
 
 1.346     0.363  
Size (+) 1.103 ***  Size (+) 0.877 *** 
 
 9.873     9.145  
OthDisc (+) 0.014   OthDisc (+) 0.020  
  0.663     1.462  
Recycled (-/0) -2.483 **  Disposed (-/0) -0.110  
 
 3.565     0.011  
         
Likelihood Ratio  35.784   Likelihood Ratio  31.671  
N  74   N  74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 17 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
Chi-squared statistics are under the coefficient estimates; 
Dependent variable Total: equals 1 if Total defined in Table 1 is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 18 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance 
Behavior – Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company (Logit 
Model) 
Dependent Variable: Total 
Panel A: Recycled  
 
Panel B: Disposed 
Variable  Coef.  
 
Variable  Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -7.022 ***  Intercept ? -7.199 *** 
 
 10.202     10.763  
Image (+) 0.083   Image (+) 1.016  
 
 0.007     1.431  
Technology (+) -1.787 **  Technology (+) 0.110  
 
 2.824     0.015  
Recycled (-/0) -4.644 **  Disposed (+/0) 1.614  
 
 5.129     0.618  
Recycled*Image (-/0) 2.359   Disposed*Image (+/0) -2.394  
 
 0.806     0.845  
Recycled*Technology (+) 8.157 **  Disposed*Technology (-) -2.144  
 
 4.558     0.554  
LitgRisk (+) 0.032 **  LitgRisk (+) 0.014  
 
 3.436     0.971  
CapDema (+) 0.396 ***  CapDema (+) 0.316 ** 
 
 6.759     4.539  
Leverage ? -2.853   Leverage ? -0.697  
 
 2.499     0.193  
Size (+) 1.217 ***  Size (+) 0.913 *** 
 
 11.656     9.290  
OthDisc (+) 0.012   OthDisc (+) 0.022 * 
  0.404     1.662  
         
Likelihood Ratio  39.946   Likelihood Ratio  32.603  
N  74   N  74  
 (continued on next page) 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
Chi-squared statistics are under the coefficient estimates;  
Dependent variable Total: equals 1 if Total defined in Table 1 is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;    
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 19 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Adjusting Toxics Amount by 
Sales for Each Management Method and Determining Image and Technology Using 
the Top One Third of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.600 ***  -25.142 ***  -4.457 ***  -19.765 *** 
 
 -5.086   -5.286   -3.418   -5.233  
Image (+) 3.918 *   3.739 **   0.179     3.220 ** 
 
  1.416     1.698     0.279     1.802   
Technology (+) 2.668     2.816 *   -0.148     3.491 ** 
 
  1.027     1.347     -0.242     1.989   
CapDema (+) 1.584 ***  1.226 ***  0.358 ***  0.804 *** 
 
 3.610   3.581   3.108   2.972  
Leverage ? -1.460   -1.085   -0.375   0.576  
 
 -0.194   -0.193   -0.182   0.140  
Size (+) 4.163 ***  3.320 ***  0.843 ***  2.422 *** 
 
 4.752   4.708   4.103   4.429  
OthDisc (+) 0.216 ***  0.179 ***  0.037 ***  0.120 *** 
  5.185   5.136   3.733   4.005  
Recycled (-/0) -0.015   -0.002   -0.013 **  0.002  
 
 -0.670   -0.118   -2.183   0.145  
             
Adj. R2  0.664   0.679   0.485   0.622  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 19 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Treated 
   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.327 ***  -25.490 ***  -4.837 ***  -19.746 *** 
 
 -5.256   -5.338   -3.868   -5.156  
Image (+) 4.295 *   3.936 **   0.359     3.217 ** 
 
  1.549     1.772     0.570     1.775   
Technology (+) 2.847     2.885 *   -0.038     3.480 ** 
 
  1.113     1.402     -0.062     2.014   
CapDema (+) 1.526 ***  1.200 ***  0.326 ***  0.806 *** 
 
 3.363   3.355   2.839   2.834  
Leverage ? -1.373   -1.069   -0.304   0.564  
 
 -0.186   -0.193   -0.154   0.137  
Size (+) 4.181 ***  3.333 ***  0.848 ***  2.423 *** 
 
 4.835   4.759   4.251   4.445  
OthDisc (+) 0.213 ***  0.177 ***  0.036 ***  0.120 *** 
  5.152   5.086   3.711   3.961  
Treated (-/0) 0.081   0.047   0.034   0.001  
 
 0.499   0.398   0.646   0.013  
             
Adj. R2  0.665   0.679   0.483   0.622  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 19 (Continued) 
Panel C: Combusted 
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.714 ***  -25.672 ***  -5.043 ***  -20.018 *** 
 
 -5.213   -5.271   -4.048   -5.082  
Image (+) 4.244 *   3.893 **   0.351     3.293 ** 
 
  1.539     1.771     0.553     1.845   
Technology (+) 2.590     2.742 *   -0.152     3.431 ** 
 
  0.996     1.303     -0.254     1.937   
CapDema (+) 1.456 ***  1.164 ***  0.292 ***  0.774 *** 
 
 3.123   3.109   2.650   2.559  
Leverage ? -1.061   -0.902   -0.159   0.659  
 
 -0.144   -0.163   -0.081   0.161  
Size (+) 4.212 ***  3.349 ***  0.864 ***  2.439 *** 
 
 4.823   4.735   4.326   4.413  
OthDisc (+) 0.214 ***  0.178 ***  0.036 ***  0.119 *** 
  5.238   5.145   3.799   3.980  
Combusted (-/0) 0.128   0.069   0.059 **  0.038  
 
 1.120   0.720   2.034   0.434  
             
Adj. R2  0.667   0.680   0.492   0.622  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 19 (Continued) 
Panel D: Disposed 
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.610 ***  -25.052 ***  -4.558 ***  -19.647 *** 
 
 -5.094   -5.257   -3.502   -5.177  
Image (+) 3.834 *   3.651 *   0.183     3.136 ** 
 
  1.381     1.653     0.285     1.757   
Technology (+) 2.650     2.758 *   -0.108     3.424 ** 
 
  1.022     1.322     -0.177     1.947   
CapDema (+) 1.584 ***  1.236 ***  0.348 ***  0.817 *** 
 
 3.636   3.623   3.036   3.004  
Leverage ? -1.509   -1.163   -0.346   0.494  
 
 -0.200   -0.206   -0.169   0.119  
Size (+) 4.174 ***  3.331 ***  0.843 ***  2.432 *** 
 
 4.754   4.704   4.094   4.423  
OthDisc (+) 0.216 ***  0.179 ***  0.037 ***  0.120 *** 
  5.229   5.143   3.841   3.990  
Disposed (+/0) -0.195   -0.136   -0.059   -0.107  
 
 -1.257   -1.085   -1.343   -0.827  
             
Adj. R2  0.665   0.679   0.481   0.622  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 19 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Recycled:  the amount of toxic waste recycled in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Treated:  the amount of toxic waste treated in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Combusted:  the amount of toxic waste combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Disposed:  the amount of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004;  
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 20 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental 
Performance – Adjusting Toxics Amount by Sales for Each Management Method and 
Determining Image and Technology Using the Top One Third of Advertising Ratio and 
R&D Ratio, Respectively 
Panel A: Recycled  
           
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.654 ***  -25.167 ***  -4.486 ***  -19.770 *** 
 
 
-5.171   -5.365   -3.468   -5.312  
Image (+) 5.350 **  4.834 **  0.516   4.237 *** 
 
 
1.847   2.108   0.755   2.416  
Technology (+) 0.144   0.784   -0.641   1.494  
 
 
0.048   0.325   -0.870   0.797  
Recycled (-/0) -0.021   -0.007   -0.014 ***  -0.003  
 
 
-0.950   -0.388   -2.409   -0.168  
Recycled*Image (-) -4.765 **  -3.514 **  -1.251 ***  -3.117 ** 
 
 
-2.241   -2.047   -2.607   -1.830  
Recycled*Technology (+) 14.837 **  12.103 **  2.734 **  12.064 ** 
 
 
2.244   2.165   1.939   1.932  
CapDema (+) 1.764 ***  1.376 ***  0.388 ***  0.957 *** 
 
 
4.104   4.143   3.252   3.860  
Leverage ? -4.991   -3.932   -1.060   -2.226  
 
 
-0.627   -0.661   -0.482   -0.513  
Size (+) 4.475 ***  3.567 ***  0.908 ***  2.660 *** 
 
 
5.053   5.009   4.284   4.862  
OthDisc (+) 0.195 ***  0.163 ***  0.032 ***  0.105 *** 
  4.589   4.558   3.157   3.514  
             
Adj. R2  0.669   0.683   0.484   0.634  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 20 (Continued) 
Panel B: Treated  
           
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -31.453 ***  -26.021 ***  -5.431 ***  -20.091 *** 
 
 
-5.545   -5.603   -4.333   -5.339  
Image (+) 2.899   2.558   0.341   2.124  
 
 
1.009   1.125   0.516   1.173  
Technology (+) 1.012   1.487   -0.475   2.426 * 
 
 
0.360   0.666   -0.718   1.344  
Treated (-/0) -0.020   -0.020   -0.001   -0.048  
 
 
-0.117   -0.155   -0.010   -0.477  
Treated*Image (-) 6.099 **  6.129 ***  -0.030   4.879 ** 
 
 
1.973   2.452   -0.048   2.334  
Treated*Technology (+) 0.544 **  0.358 *  0.185 ***  0.261 * 
 
 
1.988   1.626   2.684   1.304  
CapDema (+) 1.176 ***  0.936 ***  0.239 **  0.608 ** 
 
 
2.509   2.527   2.050   1.982  
Leverage ? -0.162   -0.290   0.128   1.127  
 
 
-0.024   -0.057   0.067   0.301  
Size (+) 4.383 ***  3.471 ***  0.911 ***  2.525 *** 
 
 
5.143   5.065   4.549   4.750  
OthDisc (+) 0.195 ***  0.160 ***  0.036 ***  0.106 *** 
  4.990   4.952   3.708   3.728  
             
Adj. R2  0.676   0.696   0.485   0.639  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 20 (Continued) 
Panel C: Combusted  
           
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -31.742 ***  -26.486 ***  -5.255 ***  -20.362 *** 
 
 
-5.114   -5.151   -4.152   -4.961  
Image (+) 4.513 *  4.272 **  0.241   3.708 ** 
 
 
1.506   1.788   0.355   1.903  
Technology (+) 2.120   2.435   -0.315   3.403 ** 
 
 
0.768   1.093   -0.496   1.859  
Combusted (-/0) 0.034   0.031   0.004   0.078  
 
 
0.132   0.135   0.062   0.355  
Combusted*Image (-) -1.327   -1.463   0.136   -1.249 * 
 
 
-0.938   -1.296   0.430   -1.464  
Combusted*Technology (+) 0.171   0.085   0.086   -0.042  
 
 
0.547   0.315   1.287   -0.167  
CapDema (+) 1.331 ***  1.083 ***  0.248 ***  0.768 ** 
 
 
2.596   2.606   2.091   2.264  
Leverage ? -0.121   -0.195   0.074   0.899  
 
 
-0.016   -0.034   0.037   0.208  
Size (+) 4.325 ***  3.439 ***  0.886 ***  2.479 *** 
 
 
4.819   4.715   4.425   4.385  
OthDisc (+) 0.212 ***  0.175 ***  0.037 ***  0.117 *** 
  5.135   5.028   3.860   3.862  
             
Adj. R2  0.658   0.672   0.481   0.614  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 20 (Continued) 
Panel D: Disposed  
           
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.657 ***  -25.115 ***  -4.543 ***  -20.121 *** 
 
 
-4.970   -5.125   -3.432   -5.115  
Image (+) 5.134 **  4.702 **  0.432   4.077 ** 
 
 
1.682   1.951   0.605   2.112  
Technology (+) 1.162   1.548   -0.386   2.214  
 
 
0.413   0.687   -0.579   1.190  
Disposed (+/0) -0.286 **  -0.211 **  -0.075 **  -0.200 ** 
 
 
-2.116   -1.988   -1.744   -2.260  
Disposed*Image (+) -10.920   -8.657   -2.263   -4.814  
 
 
-1.255   -1.161   -1.395   -0.837  
Disposed*Technology (-) 3.289 ***  2.705 ***  0.585   3.217 *** 
 
 
2.687   3.008   1.401   4.319  
CapDema (+) 1.572 ***  1.227 ***  0.344 ***  0.834 *** 
 
 
3.636   3.621   2.995   3.157  
Leverage ? -2.142   -1.669   -0.474   0.147  
 
 
-0.277   -0.287   -0.228   0.034  
Size (+) 4.235 ***  3.384 ***  0.851 ***  2.543 *** 
 
 
4.796   4.743   4.121   4.632  
OthDisc (+) 0.211 ***  0.175 ***  0.037 ***  0.114 *** 
  5.118   5.028   3.742   3.880  
             
Adj. R2  0.664   0.679   0.473   0.632  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 20 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Recycled:  the amount of toxic waste recycled in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Treated:  the amount of toxic waste treated in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Combusted:  the amount of toxic waste combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Disposed:  the amount of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004;  
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 21 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Adjusting Toxics 
Amount by Sales for Each Management Method and Considering the Tension 
between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.944 ***  -23.165 ***  -4.779 ***  -17.700 *** 
 
 -4.698   -4.701   -3.773   -4.465  
Image (+) 2.456   1.560   0.897 *  1.455  
 
 0.960   0.758   1.390   0.900  
Technology (+) 4.074 *  4.008 **  0.066   4.493 *** 
 
 1.564   1.871   0.103   2.546  
CapDema (+) 1.395 ***  1.030 ***  0.365 ***  0.613 *** 
 
 3.593   3.400   3.433   2.547  
Leverage ? -2.669   -1.686   -0.983   -0.110  
 
 -0.399   -0.341   -0.508   -0.032  
Size (+) 3.912 ***  3.048 ***  0.864 ***  2.138 *** 
 
 4.211   4.014   4.199   3.602  
OthDisc (+) 0.224 ***  0.187 ***  0.037 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.164   5.009   3.879   3.978  
Recycled (-/0) -0.016   -0.006   -0.011 **  -0.001  
 
 -0.731   -0.316   -1.682   -0.039  
             
Adj. R2  0.650   0.657   0.499   0.589  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 21 (Continued) 
Panel B: Treated 
   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.991 ***  -22.993 ***  -4.998 ***  -17.321 *** 
 
 -4.737   -4.708   -3.997   -4.433  
Image (+) 2.624   1.651   0.973 *  1.527  
 
 1.059   0.833   1.537   0.987  
Technology (+) 4.190 *  3.975 **  0.215   4.348 *** 
 
 1.653   1.919   0.340   2.559  
CapDema (+) 1.395 ***  1.060 ***  0.335 ***  0.672 *** 
 
 3.261   3.155   3.035   2.536  
Leverage ? -2.688   -1.741   -0.947   -0.209  
 
 -0.398   -0.343   -0.509   -0.057  
Size (+) 3.900 ***  3.042 ***  0.858 ***  2.134 *** 
 
 4.216   4.033   4.174   3.646  
OthDisc (+) 0.226 ***  0.189 ***  0.037 ***  0.130 *** 
  5.230   5.061   3.912   4.051  
Treated (-/0) -0.033   -0.053   0.021   -0.086  
 
 -0.206   -0.456   0.420   -0.933  
             
Adj. R2  0.650   0.658   0.497   0.593  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 21 (Continued) 
Panel C: Combusted 
   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.580 ***  -23.355 ***  -5.224 ***  -17.677 *** 
 
 -4.755   -4.675   -4.262   -4.368  
Image (+) 2.490   1.580   0.910 *  1.468  
 
 0.991   0.786   1.435   0.936  
Technology (+) 4.165 *  4.046 **  0.119   4.505 *** 
 
 1.647   1.934   0.198   2.601  
CapDema (+) 1.306 ***  1.004 ***  0.302 ***  0.616 ** 
 
 3.056   2.922   2.947   2.217  
Leverage ? -2.374   -1.603   -0.770   -0.129  
 
 -0.360   -0.322   -0.423   -0.036  
Size (+) 3.926 ***  3.051 ***  0.875 ***  2.135 *** 
 
 4.234   4.017   4.350   3.589  
OthDisc (+) 0.224 ***  0.187 ***  0.037 ***  0.128 *** 
  5.199   5.013   3.948   3.965  
Combusted (-/0) 0.069   0.019   0.050   -0.005  
 
 0.563   0.189   1.593   -0.053  
             
Adj. R2  0.650   0.657   0.504   0.589  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 21 (Continued) 
Panel D: Disposed 
   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.951 ***  -23.079 ***  -4.872 ***  -17.578 *** 
 
 -4.730   -4.722   -3.822   -4.473  
Image (+) 2.397   1.443   0.954 *  1.321  
 
 0.954   0.717   1.485   0.837  
Technology (+) 3.977 *  3.845 **  0.132   4.312 *** 
 
 1.558   1.839   0.207   2.489  
CapDema (+) 1.408 ***  1.052 ***  0.356 ***  0.637 *** 
 
 3.630   3.459   3.378   2.616  
Leverage ? -2.745   -1.758   -0.987   -0.176  
 
 -0.409   -0.353   -0.513   -0.050  
Size (+) 3.937 ***  3.074 ***  0.863 ***  2.162 *** 
 
 4.226   4.040   4.146   3.638  
OthDisc (+) 0.224 ***  0.187 ***  0.038 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.181   4.991   3.965   3.943  
Disposed (+/0) -0.280   -0.232   -0.048   -0.194  
 
 -1.596   -1.581   -1.002   -1.389  
             
Adj. R2  0.651   0.659   0.496   0.592  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 21 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Recycled:  the amount of toxic waste recycled in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Treated:  the amount of toxic waste treated in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Combusted:  the amount of toxic waste combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Disposed:  the amount of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004;  
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 22 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental 
Performance – Adjusting Toxics Amount by Sales for Each Management Method and 
Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled  
           
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.786 ***  -24.027 ***  -4.759 ***  -18.487 *** 
 
 
-4.488   -4.509   -3.570   -4.320  
Image (+) 2.084   1.162   0.922 *  1.093  
 
 
0.749   0.522   1.332   0.637  
Technology (+) 2.968   3.048   -0.081   3.600 ** 
 
 
0.994   1.238   -0.112   1.802  
Recycled (-/0) -0.028   -0.017   -0.011 **  -0.011  
 
 
-1.286   -0.989   -1.710   -0.737  
Recycled*Image (-) 0.129   0.129   -0.001   0.118 ** 
 
 
1.235   1.527   -0.023   1.735  
Recycled*Technology (+) 6.271   5.325   0.946   4.972  
 
 
0.985   1.012   0.676   0.867  
CapDema (+) 1.468 ***  1.090 ***  0.378 ***  0.669 *** 
 
 
3.629   3.460   3.408   2.637  
Leverage ? -3.617   -2.430   -1.187   -0.813  
 
 
-0.506   -0.453   -0.579   -0.209  
Size (+) 4.139 ***  3.264 ***  0.875 ***  2.336 *** 
 
 
4.156   4.010   3.992   3.645  
OthDisc (+) 0.215 ***  0.178 ***  0.036 ***  0.120 *** 
  4.764   4.613   3.683   3.641  
             
Adj. R2  0.644   0.652   0.485   0.586  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 22 (Continued) 
Panel B: Treated 
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.005 ***  -23.048 ***  -4.958 ***  -17.055 *** 
 
 
-4.665   -4.674   -3.778   -4.301  
Image (+) 1.130   0.662   0.468   0.614  
 
 
0.399   0.295   0.636   0.362  
Technology (+) 2.441   2.776   -0.335   3.528 ** 
 
 
0.854   1.189   -0.496   1.901  
Treated (-/0) -0.294 *  -0.229 *  -0.065   -0.232 ** 
 
 
-1.658   -1.645   -1.267   -1.995  
Treated*Image (-) 0.369   0.243   0.126   0.234  
 
 
1.093   0.941   1.243   1.108  
Treated*Technology (+) 0.485 *  0.335 *  0.150 **  0.209  
 
 
1.613   1.453   1.811   0.988  
CapDema (+) 1.360 ***  1.029 ***  0.331 ***  0.697 ** 
 
 
3.055   2.855   3.032   2.351  
Leverage ? -2.895   -1.836   -1.060   -0.599  
 
 
-0.450   -0.373   -0.617   -0.169  
Size (+) 4.018 ***  3.125 ***  0.893 ***  2.180 *** 
 
 
4.334   4.134   4.337   3.701  
OthDisc (+) 0.230 ***  0.191 ***  0.039 ***  0.133 *** 
  5.412   5.159   4.299   4.104  
             
Adj. R2  0.646   0.652   0.499   0.585  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 22 (Continued) 
Panel C: Combusted 
            
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.157 ***  -23.557 ***  -5.600 ***  -17.146 *** 
 
 
-4.805   -4.660   -4.546   -4.256  
Image (+) 1.766   0.917   0.850   0.647  
 
 
0.637   0.415   1.198   0.380  
Technology (+) 2.940   3.116 *  -0.176   3.814 ** 
 
 
1.075   1.382   -0.272   2.059  
Combusted (-/0) -0.435   -0.393   -0.042   -0.394 * 
 
 
-0.988   -1.164   -0.323   -1.519  
Combusted*Image (-) 0.419   0.384   0.036   0.473  
 
 
0.763   0.874   0.230   1.282  
Combusted*Technology (+) 0.608 *  0.476 *  0.132   0.396 * 
 
 
1.344   1.363   1.023   1.473  
CapDema (+) 1.207 ***  0.951 ***  0.255 **  0.643 ** 
 
 
2.722   2.684   2.291   2.262  
Leverage ? -1.611   -1.151   -0.459   -0.159  
 
 
-0.242   -0.229   -0.250   -0.045  
Size (+) 4.045 ***  3.123 ***  0.922 ***  2.135 *** 
 
 
4.359   4.086   4.698   3.595  
OthDisc (+) 0.227 ***  0.190 ***  0.037 ***  0.131 *** 
  5.267   5.036   4.135   3.982  
             
Adj. R2  0.644   0.650   0.496   0.582  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 22 (Continued) 
Panel D: Disposed 
            
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.881 ***  -23.022 ***  -4.859 ***  -17.557 *** 
 
 
-4.728   -4.715   -3.842   -4.433  
Image (+) 2.904   1.869   1.035 *  1.635  
 
 
1.037   0.841   1.429   0.956  
Technology (+) 3.758 *  3.645 *  0.113   4.004 ** 
 
 
1.368   1.607   0.173   2.172  
Disposed (+/0) -0.272 **  -0.227 **  -0.045   -0.209 ** 
 
 
-1.885   -1.949   -0.937   -2.221  
Disposed*Image (+) -1.078   -0.910   -0.168   -0.709  
 
 
-0.634   -0.592   -0.459   -0.488  
Disposed*Technology (-) 0.736   0.661   0.075   0.932  
 
 
0.463   0.515   0.202   0.565  
CapDema (+) 1.381 ***  1.029 ***  0.352 ***  0.619 *** 
 
 
3.616   3.441   3.354   2.614  
Leverage ? -2.468   -1.523   -0.945   0.021  
 
 
-0.360   -0.300   -0.482   0.006  
Size (+) 3.909 ***  3.051 ***  0.858 ***  2.154 *** 
 
 
4.201   4.010   4.146   3.606  
OthDisc (+) 0.225 ***  0.187 ***  0.038 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.171   4.975   3.952   3.923  
             
Adj. R2  0.642   0.650   0.481   0.582  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 22 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Recycled:  the amount of toxic waste recycled in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Treated:  the amount of toxic waste treated in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Combusted:  the amount of toxic waste combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004; 
Disposed:  the amount of toxic waste disposed of or otherwise released in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue of 2004;  
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 23 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Adding Together the Scaled 
Toxics Amount Managed by the Three Desirable Methods and Determining Image 
and Technology Using the Top One Third of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, 
Respectively 
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.898 ***  -25.349 ***  -4.549 ***  -19.856 *** 
 
 -5.210   -5.370   -3.522   -5.254  
Image (+) 4.018 *   3.815 **   0.203     3.256 ** 
 
  1.459     1.735     0.320     1.824   
Technology (+) 2.775     2.865 *   -0.090     3.503 ** 
 
  1.077     1.385     -0.146     2.018   
CapDema (+) 1.553 ***  1.205 ***  0.348 ***  0.795 *** 
 
 3.379   3.352   2.868   2.787  
Leverage ? -1.345   -1.019   -0.325   0.599  
 
 -0.180   -0.183   -0.158   0.147  
Size (+) 4.160 ***  3.322 ***  0.837 ***  2.425 *** 
 
 4.787   4.739   4.103   4.451  
OthDisc (+) 0.216 ***  0.179 ***  0.037 ***  0.120 *** 
  5.268   5.189   3.850   4.024  
Desired (-/0) 0.005   0.007   -0.002   0.005  
 
 0.161   0.315   -0.251   0.255  
             
Adj. R2  0.664   0.679   0.479   0.622  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 23 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Desired: the amount of toxic waste recycled, treated, and combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue 
of 2004; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 24 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and 
Environmental Performance – Adding Together the Scaled Toxics Amount 
Managed by the Three Desirable Methods and Determining Image and Technology 
Using the Top One Third of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
  
           
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -31.279 ***  -25.951 ***  -5.327 ***  -20.051 *** 
 
 
-5.099   -5.169   -4.009   -4.987  
Image (+) 3.823   3.499 *  0.324   3.003 * 
 
 
1.172   1.354   0.437   1.468  
Technology (+) 1.971   2.446   -0.475   3.323 ** 
 
 
0.711   1.091   -0.753   1.800  
Desired (-/0) -0.006   0.001   -0.007   0.002  
 
 
-0.240   0.042   -0.965   0.090  
Desired*Image (-) 0.390   0.508   -0.118   0.386  
 
 
0.251   0.366   -0.367   0.367  
Desired*Technology (+) 0.151 **  0.082   0.069 ***  0.037  
 
 
1.773   1.156   3.791   0.620  
CapDema (+) 1.338 ***  1.092 ***  0.246 **  0.746 ** 
 
 
2.667   2.717   2.006   2.268  
Leverage ? -0.461   -0.600   0.140   0.757  
 
 
-0.063   -0.109   0.069   0.186  
Size (+) 4.285 ***  3.374 ***  0.912 ***  2.439 *** 
 
 
4.718   4.593   4.433   4.276  
OthDisc (+) 0.214 ***  0.178 ***  0.036 ***  0.120 *** 
  5.211   5.125   3.838   3.986  
             
Adj. R2  0.659   0.672   0.486   0.612  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 24 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Desired: the amount of toxic waste recycled, treated, and combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue 
of 2004; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 25 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Adding Together the Scaled 
Toxics Amount Managed by the Three Desirable Methods and Considering the 
Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -27.948 ***  -23.085 ***  -4.863 ***  -17.541 *** 
 
 -4.697   -4.675   -3.834   -4.401  
Image (+) 2.546   1.568   0.977 *  1.414  
 
 1.004   0.772   1.511   0.885  
Technology (+) 4.154 *  3.996 **  0.158   4.418 *** 
 
 1.614   1.897   0.245   2.549  
CapDema (+) 1.397 ***  1.042 ***  0.355 ***  0.634 *** 
 
 3.333   3.176   3.130   2.436  
Leverage ? -2.703   -1.721   -0.982   -0.156  
 
 -0.404   -0.346   -0.510   -0.045  
Size (+) 3.903 ***  3.046 ***  0.857 ***  2.139 *** 
 
 4.205   4.017   4.142   3.612  
OthDisc (+) 0.225 ***  0.187 ***  0.038 ***  0.127 *** 
  5.206   5.018   3.967   3.966  
Desired (-/0) -0.008   -0.007   -0.002   -0.007  
 
 -0.299   -0.302   -0.205   -0.407  
             
Adj. R2  0.650   0.657   0.495   0.590  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 25 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Desired: the amount of toxic waste recycled, treated, and combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue 
of 2004; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 26 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and 
Environmental Performance – Adding Together the Scaled Toxics Amount 
Managed by the Three Desirable Methods and Considering the Tension between 
the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.329 ***  -23.855 ***  -5.474 ***  -17.801 *** 
 
 
-4.795   -4.687   -4.396   -4.333  
Image (+) 1.336   0.723   0.612   0.701  
 
 
0.459   0.310   0.842   0.393  
Technology (+) 3.107   3.387 *  -0.281   4.151 ** 
 
 
1.123   1.478   -0.430   2.219  
Desired (-/0) -0.031 *  -0.022 *  -0.010 *  -0.018  
 
 
-1.487   -1.310   -1.452   -1.286  
Desired*Image (-) 0.091   0.067   0.024   0.064  
 
 
0.838   0.740   0.863   0.800  
Desired*Technology (+) 0.132 *  0.073   0.059 ***  0.022  
 
 
1.637   1.105   3.148   0.407  
CapDema (+) 1.263 ***  0.979 ***  0.284 ***  0.642 ** 
 
 
2.749   2.651   2.504   2.162  
Leverage ? -1.928   -1.340   -0.588   -0.156  
 
 
-0.297   -0.273   -0.328   -0.045  
Size (+) 4.110 ***  3.173 ***  0.937 ***  2.212 *** 
 
 
4.347   4.094   4.590   3.641  
OthDisc (+) 0.220 ***  0.184 ***  0.036 ***  0.125 *** 
  5.049   4.888   3.796   3.849  
             
Adj. R2  0.644   0.650   0.498   0.580  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 26 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Desired: the amount of toxic waste recycled, treated, and combusted for energy recovery in 2004 adjusted by the sales revenue 
of 2004; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;   
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 27 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Including a Fixed Effect for 
Pharmaceutical Companies and Determining Image and Technology based on the Top 
One Third of Advertising Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -29.761 ***  -25.213 ***  -4.548 ***  -19.760 *** 
 
 -5.314   -5.579   -3.499   -5.574  
Image (+) 3.529   3.201 *  0.329   2.698 * 
 
 1.234   1.432   0.481   1.474  
Technology (+) 2.127   2.114   0.013   2.917 * 
 
 0.752   0.916   0.021   1.522  
LitgRisk (+) 0.002   0.003   -0.001   -0.001  
 
 0.079   0.147   -0.110   -0.035  
CapDema (+) 1.552 ***  1.200 ***  0.353 ***  0.787 *** 
 
 3.333   3.295   2.939   2.741  
Leverage ? -1.061   -0.575   -0.486   1.109  
 
 -0.142   -0.104   -0.233   0.273  
Size (+) 4.141 ***  3.283 ***  0.857 ***  2.369 *** 
 
 4.750   4.738   4.093   4.429  
OthDisc (+) 0.215 ***  0.178 ***  0.037 ***  0.121 *** 
  5.090   5.096   3.686   4.001  
Recycled (-/0) -0.016   0.402   -0.418   0.956  
 
 -0.005   0.169   -0.477   0.510  
Pharmaceutical ? 1.610   1.996   -0.386   1.735  
  0.515   0.789   -0.582   0.812  
             
Adj. R2  0.655   0.672   0.467   0.615  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 27 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed 
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -28.595 ***  -24.119 ***  -4.476 ***  -19.000 *** 
 
 -5.322   -5.637   -3.398   -5.606  
Image (+) 3.948 *  3.591 *  0.357   2.965 * 
 
 1.403   1.618   0.532   1.605  
Technology (+) 1.830   1.772   0.059   2.576 * 
 
 0.635   0.756   0.092   1.333  
LitgRisk (+) -0.006   -0.003   -0.003   -0.002  
 
 -0.229   -0.140   -0.404   -0.135  
CapDema (+) 1.508 ***  1.160 ***  0.348 ***  0.763 *** 
 
 3.438   3.458   2.828   2.850  
Leverage ? -0.153   0.193   -0.346   1.507  
 
 -0.023   0.040   -0.168   0.425  
Size (+) 4.071 ***  3.234 ***  0.837 ***  2.360 *** 
 
 4.807   4.848   4.006   4.588  
OthDisc (+) 0.209 ***  0.172 ***  0.037 ***  0.115 *** 
  4.949   4.889   3.887   3.786  
Disposed (+/0) -5.411   -5.017 **  -0.394   -3.385  
 
 -1.558   -1.951   -0.348   -1.600  
Pharmaceutical ? 1.759   2.188   -0.429   1.954  
  0.548   0.844   -0.628   0.887  
             
Adj. R2  0.663   0.683   0.466   0.623  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 27 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Pharmaceutical:   equals 1 if the SIC code of a company is 2834, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;  
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 28 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance – Including a Fixed 
Effect for Pharmaceutical Companies and Determining Image and Technology based on the Top One Third of Advertising 
Ratio and R&D Ratio, Respectively 
Panel A: Recycled   
  
       
 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.036 ***  -23.161 ***  -3.876 ***  -18.302 *** 
  5.373   4.369   1.274   3.505  
Image (+) 4.069 *  3.646 *  0.423   3.184 ** 
  2.932   2.321   0.686   1.840  
Technology (+) -2.588   -1.490   -1.098   0.132  
  3.250   2.657   0.758   2.262  
Recycled (-/0) -5.024   -3.339   -1.685   -1.568  
  3.927   2.906   1.341   2.141  
Recycled*Image (-) -10.427 **  -8.247 **  -2.180 *  -7.566 ** 
  5.192   4.092   1.376   3.514  
Recycled*Technology (+) 30.749 ***  23.585 ***  7.164 ***  18.598 *** 
  8.003   6.563   1.843   5.934  
LitgRisk (+) 0.018   0.015   0.003   0.007  
  0.032   0.024   0.010   0.020  
CapDema (+) 1.728 ***  1.334 ***  0.394 ***  0.891 *** 
  0.431   0.340   0.111   0.278  
Leverage ? -6.783   -4.945   -1.838   -2.256  
  7.384   5.559   2.055   4.166  
Size (+) 4.357 ***  3.451 ***  0.906 ***  2.509 *** 
  0.819   0.655   0.198   0.518  
OthDisc (+) 0.185 ***  0.155 ***  0.030 ***  0.102 *** 
  0.044   0.037   0.010   0.032  
Pharmaceutical ? 3.798   3.665   0.133   3.015  
  2.814   2.273   0.622   1.955  
             
Adj. R2  0.684   0.697   0.502   0.642  
N  74   74   74   74  
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TABLE 28 (Continued) 
Panel B: Disposed  
           
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -30.026 ***  -25.149 ***  -4.877 ***  -19.888 *** 
 
 5.171   4.164   1.241   3.296  
Image (+) 6.087 **  5.103 **  0.984 *  4.259 ** 
 
 3.056   2.443   0.693   2.023  
Technology (+) 2.195   2.083   0.113   2.862 * 
 
 3.036   2.447   0.678   1.969  
Disposed (+/0) 4.538   2.245   2.293 *  2.914  
 
 4.029   3.285   1.543   2.674  
Disposed*Image (+) -18.735 ***  -13.310 **  -5.425 ***  -11.410 ** 
 
 7.789   6.340   2.106   5.564  
Disposed*Technology (-) 1.804   0.717   1.087   0.400  
 
 7.014   5.595   1.715   5.138  
LitgRisk (+) 0.007   0.007   0.000   0.006  
 
 0.028   0.021   0.008   0.017  
CapDema (+) 1.512 ***  1.153 ***  0.359 ***  0.753 *** 
 
 0.402   0.313   0.111   0.244  
Leverage ? 4.071   3.224   0.847   4.116  
 
 6.363   4.775   1.803   3.641  
Size (+) 3.869 ***  3.084 ***  0.786 ***  2.228 *** 
 
 0.846   0.668   0.204   0.515  
OthDisc (+) 0.218 ***  0.178 ***  0.040 ***  0.120 *** 
  0.040   0.034   0.009   0.029  
Pharmaceutical ? 2.700   2.887   -0.187   2.564  
  3.334   2.691   0.721   2.267  
             
Adj. R2  0.675   0.691   0.491   0.635  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 28 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Pharmaceutical:   equals 1 if the SIC code of a company is 2834, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 3;  
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 29 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on VED Behavior – Including a Fixed Effect for 
Pharmaceutical Companies and Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive 
Strategies within a Company 
  
           
Panel A: Recycled 
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -28.820 ***  -23.999 ***  -4.822 ***  -18.385 *** 
 
 -5.102   -5.205   -3.768   -4.992  
Image (+) 2.501   1.554   0.947 *  1.451  
 
 1.003   0.780   1.475   0.921  
Technology (+) 2.367   2.212   0.156   2.900 * 
 
 0.841   0.979   0.219   1.587  
LitgRisk (+) -0.006   -0.005   -0.001   -0.007  
 
 -0.205   -0.221   -0.118   -0.416  
CapDema (+) 1.454 ***  1.098 ***  0.356 ***  0.681 *** 
 
 3.320   3.186   3.170   2.505  
Leverage ? -2.013   -0.969   -1.044   0.590  
 
 -0.288   -0.186   -0.537   0.161  
Size (+) 3.984 ***  3.116 ***  0.868 ***  2.180 *** 
 
 4.411   4.298   4.114   3.909  
OthDisc (+) 0.219 ***  0.182 ***  0.037 ***  0.124 *** 
  5.001   4.942   3.762   3.951  
Recycled (-/0) 0.094   0.419   -0.324   0.930  
 
 0.030   0.171   -0.379   0.498  
Pharmaceutical ? 3.908   4.003   -0.095   3.572 * 
  1.326   1.652   -0.154   1.755  
             
Adj. R2  0.648   0.660   0.480   0.598  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 29 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
 
            
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
 
            
Intercept ? -27.734 ***  -22.981 ***  -4.753 ***  -17.698 *** 
 
 -5.055   -5.173   -3.701   -5.000  
Image (+) 2.427   1.455   0.972 *  1.327  
 
 0.971   0.738   1.504   0.860  
Technology (+) 2.183   1.981   0.203   2.629 * 
 
 0.771   0.875   0.288   1.439  
LitgRisk (+) -0.014   -0.011   -0.003   -0.009  
 
 -0.542   -0.556   -0.374   -0.561  
CapDema (+) 1.410 ***  1.058 ***  0.351 ***  0.658 *** 
 
 3.382   3.287   3.043   2.556  
Leverage ? -1.029   -0.089   -0.940   1.102  
 
 -0.165   -0.020   -0.490   0.337  
Size (+) 3.922 ***  3.072 ***  0.850 ***  2.177 *** 
 
 4.471   4.395   4.047   4.039  
OthDisc (+) 0.213 ***  0.176 ***  0.037 ***  0.118 *** 
  4.896   4.774   3.939   3.744  
Disposed (+/0) -4.784   -4.461 **  -0.324   -2.967  
 
 -1.500   -1.928   -0.295   -1.569  
Pharmaceutical ? 4.162   4.278 *  -0.116   3.829 * 
  1.399   1.747   -0.185   1.851  
             
Adj. R2  0.654   0.669   0.480   0.604  
N  74   74   74   74  
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 29 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Pharmaceutical:   equals 1 if the SIC code of a company is 2834, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;  
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 30 
The Effect of Competitive Strategy on the Association between VED and Environmental Performance – Including a Fixed Effect 
for Pharmaceutical Companies and Considering the Tension between the Two Competitive Strategies within a Company 
Panel A: Recycled  
           
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -27.699 ***  -23.087 ***  -4.612 ***  -17.544 *** 
  -5.447   -5.497   -3.963   -5.142  
Image (+) 1.156   0.650   0.506   1.068  
  0.384   0.268   0.679   0.573  
Technology (+) -3.131   -1.930   -1.201   -0.136  
  -0.962   -0.732   -1.399   -0.060  
Recycled (-/0) -11.154 **  -7.895 **  -3.259 ***  -4.757 ** 
  -2.352   -2.123   -2.581   -1.758  
Recycled*Image (-) 6.297   4.175   2.122   1.608  
  1.051   0.922   1.087   0.499  
Recycled*Technology (+) 31.145 ***  23.578 ***  7.567 ***  17.583 *** 
  3.862   3.550   4.086   3.029  
LitgRisk (+) 0.032   0.023   0.009   0.012  
  1.051   0.968   1.067   0.616  
CapDema (+) 1.781 ***  1.348 ***  0.433 ***  0.875 *** 
  4.519   4.259   4.258   3.283  
Leverage ? -7.787   -5.402   -2.385   -2.874  
  -1.171   -1.053   -1.318   -0.762  
Size (+) 4.614 ***  3.579 ***  1.035 ***  2.489 *** 
  5.230   5.027   4.861   4.416  
OthDisc (+) 0.180 ***  0.153 ***  0.027 ***  0.104 *** 
  3.737   3.757   2.608   3.009  
Pharmaceutical ? 5.541 **  5.253 **  0.289   4.537 ** 
  2.048   2.360   0.494   2.329  
             
Adj. R2  0.683   0.690   0.527   0.627  
N  74   74   74   74  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 30 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Disposed 
            
             
  Total 
  
Hard   Soft   A3 
 
Variable  Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
  
Coef. 
 
Intercept ? -31.318 ***  -25.493 ***  -5.825 ***  -19.458 *** 
 
 -5.624   -5.562   -4.643   -5.207  
Image (+) 4.839 **  3.139 *  1.700 **  2.490 * 
 
 1.712   1.424   2.285   1.450  
Technology (+) 4.198 *  3.438 *  0.760   3.762 ** 
 
 1.415   1.438   1.062   1.992  
Disposed (+/0) 9.521 **  5.700 **  3.821 *  4.486 ** 
 
 2.089   1.752   1.615   1.788  
Disposed*Image (+) -19.405 ***  -13.584 ***  -5.821 **  -9.481 *** 
 
 -3.236   -3.234   -2.051   -2.785  
Disposed*Technology (-) -17.141 ***  -12.445 ***  -4.696 **  -9.786 *** 
 
 -2.933   -2.761   -1.955   -2.450  
LitgRisk (+) -0.007   -0.006   -0.001   -0.005  
 
 -0.269   -0.284   -0.162   -0.267  
CapDema (+) 1.536 ***  1.140 ***  0.397 ***  0.697 *** 
 
 3.944   3.690   3.855   2.810  
Leverage ? 0.671   1.122   -0.450   1.997  
 
 0.112   0.252   -0.257   0.608  
Size (+) 4.081 ***  3.177 ***  0.904 ***  2.236 *** 
 
 4.765   4.627   4.461   4.188  
OthDisc (+) 0.218 ***  0.179 ***  0.039 ***  0.121 *** 
  5.204   5.039   4.201   3.953  
Pharmaceutical ? 4.425   4.469 *  -0.045   3.982 * 
  1.555   1.890   -0.076   1.952  
             
Adj. R2  0.663   0.674   0.503   0.605  
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 30 (Continued) 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, in a one-tailed test if a directional prediction is made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise; 
t-statistics are under the coefficient estimates; based on robust standard errors; 
Dependent variables are VED scores on top of each model; 
Pharmaceutical:   equals 1 if the SIC code of a company is 2834, and 0 otherwise; 
Image and Technology are defined in Table 11;  
Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Disclosure Checklist of Voluntary Environmental Disclosure 
Source: Clarkson et al. (2006) 
HARD DISCLOSURE ITEMS Map to GRI 
 
 
A1) Governance Structure and Management Systems (max score is 6)   
1. Existence of a Department for pollution control and/or management positions for env. management (0-1) 3.1 
2. Existence of an Environmental and/or a Public Issues Committee in the board (0-1) 3.1 
3. Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding env. practices (0-1)   
4. Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies (0-1) 1.1, 3.10 
5. Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (0-1) 3.14, 3.20 
6. Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance (0-1) 3.5 
  
A2) Credibility (max score is 10)   
1. Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a CERES report (0-1) 3.14 
2. Independent verification/assurance about environmental information disclosed in the EP report/Web.(0-1)   
3. Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental performance and/or systems (0-1) 3.19, 2.20,21 
4. Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies (0-1) 3.2 
5. Product Certification with respect to environmental impact (0-1) 3.16 
6. External Environmental Performance Awards and/or inclusion in a Sustainability Index (0-1)   
7. Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process (0-1) 1.1, 3.10 
8. Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA or Department of Energy (0-1) 3.15 
9. Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (0-1) 3.15 
10. Participation in other environmental organizations/assoc. to improve environmental practices (if not awarded under 8 
or 9 above) (0-1) 3.15 
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A3) Environmental Performance Indicators (EPI) (max score is 60)*   
1. EPI on energy use and/or energy efficiency (0-6) EN3,4,17 
2. EPI on water use and/or water use efficiency (0-6) EN5 
3. EPI on green house gas emissions (0-6) EN8 
4. EPI on other air emissions (0-6) EN9,10 
5. EPI on TRI (land, water, air) (0-6) EN11 
6. EPI on other discharges, releases and/or spills (not TRI) (0-6) EN12,13 
7. EPI on waste generation and/or management (recycling, re-use, reducing, treatment and disposal) (0-6) EN11 
8. EPI on land and resources use, biodiversity and conservation (0-6) EN6,7 
9. EPI on environmental impacts of products and services (0-6) EN14 
10. EPI on compliance performance (e.g. exceedances, reportable incidents) (0-6) EN16 
    
A4) Environmental Spending (max score is 3)   
1. Summary of dollar savings arising from environment initiatives to the company (0-1)   
2. Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or innovations to enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency (0-1) EN35 
3. Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues (0-1) EN16 
    
NOTE: * The scoring scale of environmental performance data is from 0 to 6. A point is awarded for each 
of the following items:   
1) Performance data is presented   
2) Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals or industry   
3) Performance data is presented relative to previous periods (trend analysis)   
4) Performance data is presented relative to targets   
5) Performance data is presented both in absolute and normalized form   
6) Performance data is presented at disaggregate level (i.e. plant, business unit, geographic segment).   
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SOFT DISCLOSURE ITEMS Map to GRI  
 
 
A5) Vision and Strategy Claims (max score is 6)   
1. CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders (0-1)   
2. A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, environ. codes of conduct (0-1) 1.1, 1.2, 3.7 
3. A statement about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performance (0-1) 3.19 
4. A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental performance (0-1) 3.19 
5. A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance (if not awarded under A3) (0-1) 1.1 
6. A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (0-1) 1.1 
    
A6) Environmental Profile (max score is 4)   
1. A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with specific environmental standards (0-1) GN 8 
2. An overview of environmental impact of the industry (0-1) GN 8 
3. An overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact the environment. (0-1) GN 8 
4. An overview of corporate environmental performance relative to industry peers (0-1) GN 8 
  
A7) Environmental Initiatives (max score is 6)   
1. A substantive description of employee training in environmental management and operations (0-1) 3.19 
2. Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents (0-1)   
3. Internal Environmental Awards (0-1)   
4. Internal Environmental Audits (0-1) 3.19 3.20 
5. Internal certification of environmental programs (0-1) 3.19 
6. Community involvement and/or donations related to environ. (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7 ) (0-1) SO1, EC10 
    
 
 
The “Map to GRI” column refers to the corresponding section in the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2002 published by the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
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APPENDIX B 
The List of Sample Chemical Companies 
No. Company Names 
1 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 
2 AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS INC. 
3 ALBEMARLE CORP. 
4 ALPHARMA INC. 
5 AMERICAN VANGUARD CORP. 
6 ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC. 
7 BARR PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
8 BIOGEN IDEC INC. 
9 BIOSITE INC. 
10 BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. 
11 CALGON CARBON CORP. 
12 CELANESE CORP. 
13 CHIRON CORP. 
14 CHURCH & DWIGHT CO. INC. 
15 CLOROX CO. 
16 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO. 
17 CYTEC INDUSTRIES INC. 
18 DOW CHEMICAL CO. 
19 DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS 
20 EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO. 
21 ECOLAB INC. 
22 ELI LILLY & CO. 
23 ENGELHARD CORP. 
24 ENZON PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
25 EQUISTAR CHEMICALS LP 
26 ESTEE LAUDER INC. 
27 GENZYME CORP. 
28 HERCULES INC. 
29 HEXCEL CORP. 
30 HOSPIRA INC. 
31 HUNTSMAN CORP. 
32 INTEGRATED BIOPHARMA INC. 
33 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES INC. 
34 INVITROGEN CORP. 
35 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
36 JOHNSONDIVERSEY INC. 
37 KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
38 KOPPERS INC. 
39 LSB INDUSTRIES INC. 
40 LYONDELL CHEMICAL CO. 
41 MACDERMID INC. 
42 MERCK & CO INC. 
43 MINERALS TECHNOLOGIES INC. 
44 MONSANTO CO. 
45 NALCO HOLDING CO. 
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46 NEWMARKET CORP. 
47 NOVEN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
48 OMNOVA SOLUTIONS INC. 
49 PERRIGO CO. 
50 PFIZER INC. 
51 POLYONE CORP. 
52 PPG INDUSTRIES INC. 
53 PRAXAIR INC. 
54 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO. 
55 REVLON INC. 
56 ROHM & HAAS CO. 
57 RPM INTERNATIONAL INC. 
58 SCHERING-PLOUGH CORP. 
59 SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO. 
60 SENSIENT TECHNOLOGIES. 
61 SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO. 
62 SIGMA-ALDRICH CORP. 
63 SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC. 
64 SOLUTIA INC. 
65 STEPAN CO. 
66 SYNTHETECH INC. 
67 US ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) 
68 VALSPAR CORP. 
69 VERASUN ENERGY CORP. 
70 VIRBAC CORP. 
71 W.R. GRACE & CO. 
72 WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
73 WELLMAN INC. 
74 WYETH 
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